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1
Introduction
The historical origins of coding theory are in the problem of reliable communication over noisy channels.
Claude Shannon, in the introduction to his classic paper, “A Mathematical Theory of Communication” wrote
The fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately
a message selected at another point in 1948. Error-correcting codes are widely used in applications such as
returning pictures from deep space, design of numbers on Debit/Credit cards, ISBN on books, telephone num-
bers generation, cryptography and many more. It is fascinating to note the crucial role played by mathematics
in successful deployment of those.
The progress of cryptography is closely related with the development of coding theory. In late 1970s,
analogous to RSA, coding theory also started shaping public key cryptography. Robert J. McEliece, in 1978,
introduced a public-key cryptosystem based upon encoding the plaintext as codewords of an error correcting
code from the family of Goppa codes[19]. In the originally proposed system, a codeword is generated from
plaintext message bits by using a permuted and scrambled generator matrix of a Goppa code of length n,
capable of correcting t errors. This matrix is the public key. In this system, the ciphertext is formed by adding
a randomly chosen error vector, containing some fixed number of non-zero bits, to each codeword of perturbed
code. The unperturbed Goppa code, together with scrambler and permutation matrices form the private key. On
reception, the associated private key is used to invoke an error-correcting decoder based upon the underlying
Goppa code to correct the garbled bits in the codeword.
Due to inadequate and less effectiveness, code-based cryptosystems never came for widespread; though it
is now being studied that these have not been directly affected by the algorithms developed by Peter Shor and
Lov Grover. Some of these cryptosystems are proved to have substantial cryptographic strength which can be
modified to achieve high security standards. This provides ample margin against advances in super computing,
including quantum computers.
Based on error-correcting codes and the difficult problem of decoding a message with random errors, the
security of McEliece cryptosystem does not depend on the difficulty of factoring integers or finding the discrete
logarithm of a number like in RSA, ElGamal and other well known cryptosystems. The security of these well
known public key cryptosystems is at risk once quantum computers come to effect. These computers not only
promise to provide an enormous leap in computing power available to attackers but they effectively attack
the heart of these well known cryptosystems, i.e. the problem to factor large integers and to solve discrete
logarithms.
The security in McEliece cryptosystem lies on the ability of recovering plaintexts from ciphertexts, using
a hidden error-correcting code, which the sender initially garbles with random errors. Quantum computers
do not seem to give any significant improvements in attacking code-based systems, beyond the improvement
in brute force search possible with Grover’s algorithm. Therefore McEliece encryption scheme is one of the
interesting code-based candidates for post-quantum cryptography. Due to problem of its large key sizes, this
encryption scheme is modified a number of times. One such modification includes a “dual” variant of Gen-
eralized Reed Solomon codes, namely, Niederreiter in 1986. It improved the key size issue [20] which gave
the speedups in software [4] and hardware implementations[29]. In 2017, Daniel J. Bernstein et al. proposed
Classic McEliece, which is a code based post-quantum public key cryptosystem (PKC) candidate for NIST’s
global standardization.
The security level of McEliece cryptosystem has persisted outstandingly stable, despite a lot of attack papers
over 40 years. This resulted in improving efficiency and extending one-way chosen plaintext attacks (OW-CPA)
to indistinguishability against adaptive chosen ciphertexts attack (IND-CCA2) security.
This report is primarily projected in such a way that the reader remains connected to main topic while cover-
ing necessary basics and fundamentals. Chapter 1 covers preliminaries and mathematical background required
for understanding the primary objective of this report. It includes theory of finite fields, rings of polynomials,
coding theory, error-correcting codes like Goppa codes including their encoding and decoding. Then following
Chapter 2 begins by introducing coding theory based cryptosystems, which also includes the hard problems that
roots the code based cryptography. We give a brief overview of information-set decoding (ISD) attack which
can be applied on majority of code based cryptosystems. Chapter 3 covers the original McEliece cryptosys-
tem based upon binary Goppa codes, with some attacks which can be applied on this scheme. Alongside, we
describe the key size of the parameters imparted in the literature. Chapter 4 explains dual variant of McEliece
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cryptosystem, viz. Niederreiter scheme. Then we arrive at key encapsulation mechanism, namely, Classic
McEliece in chapter 5 and cover the attacks and weaknesses of this code-based cryptosystem. The following
chapter 6 indicates the strength of this cryptosystem addressing the points which lead to IND-CCA2 security.
Then we conclude this report in chapter 7 describing some possibilities in future work. We have successfully
implemented ISD attacks on small parameters set on McEliece cryptosystem in Appendix.
1 Preliminaries
The birth of coding theory was inspired by work of Golay, Hamming and Shannon in late 1940’s. Coding theory
is a field of study concerned with the transmission of data across noisy channels and the recovery of corrupted
messages. Equivalently, coding theory deals with attaining reliable and efficient information transmission over
a noisy channel. The core of this subject lies in finding new error-correcting codes with improved parameters,
along with developing their encoding and decoding algorithms. The algebraic codes which possess interesting
attributes are highly demanded in specific areas. Codes which have some sort of randomness in their structure
are admired by cryptographers. The goal of coding theory is then to encode information in such a way that
even if the channel (or storage medium) acquaint errors, the receiver can correct the errors and retrieve the
original transmitted information. The term error-correcting code is used for both the detection and the correction
mechanisms. In other words, to be accurate, we have error-detecting code and error-correcting code. The earlier
one allows the detection of errors, whereas, later provides correction of errors discovered.
Usually, coding is categorized as source coding and channel coding. Source coding involves changing the
message source to a suitable code to be transmitted through the channel. An example of source coding is the
ASCII code, which converts each character to a byte of 8 bits. The idea of channel coding is to encode the
message again after the source coding by introducing some form of redundancy so that errors can be detected
or even corrected.
This section covers the basic definitions and useful results which form grounds for Code-based cryptogra-
phy. We begin by defining a code, a linear code, parity-check matrix, generator matrix, dimension of a linear
code, Hamming distance of a code, Perfect codes, Syndrome decoding, Goppa codes, etc. While the underly-
ing field upon which most codes rely, we keep discussing some points related to finite fields to give reader the
complete understanding.
1.1 Finite Fields
Fields play a central role in algebra. For one thing, results about them find important applications in the
theory of numbers. The general theory of finite fields began with the work of Carl Friedrich Gauss (17771855)
and Evarist Galois (18111832), but it only became of interest for applied mathematicians and engineers in
recent decades because of its many applications to mathematics, computer science and communication theory.
Nowadays, the theory of finite fields has become very rich.
Definition 1.1 A nonempty set R is said to be a ring if in R there are defined two operations, denoted by ‘+’
(addition) and ‘·’ (multiplication) respectively, such that for a, b, c inR:
(i) a + b is inR;
(ii) a + b = b + a;
(iii) (a + b) + c = a + (b + c);
(iv) There is an element 0 inR such that a + 0 = a (for every a inR);
(v) There exists an element ‘−a’ inR such that a + (−a) = 0;
(vi) a · b is inR;
(vii) a · (b · c) = (a · b) · c;
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(viii) a · (b + c) = a · b + a · c and (b + c) · a = b · a + c · a (the two distributive laws).
Axioms (i) through (iv) merely state that R is an abelian group under the operation ‘+’, which we call
addition. Axioms (vi) and (vii) insist that R be closed under an associative operation ‘·’, which we call multi-
plication. Axiom (viii) serves to interrelate the two operations ofR. Further, if the multiplication ofR is such
that a · b = b · a for every a, b inR, thenR is said to be a ‘commutative ring’.
From the notion of rings, we articulate the definition of fields which beholds the prime focus of this report.
A definition of which by I.N.Hernstein is stated as
Definition 1.2 Field is a commutative ring with unit element in which every nonzero element has a multiplica-
tive inverse.
More generally, one may define a field by the following definition.
Definition 1.3 A field is a nonempty set F of elements with two operations ‘+’ (addition) and ‘·’ (multiplica-
tion), which satisfies the following for all a, b and c ∈ F:
(i) Closure w.r.t. addition and multiplication: a + b ∈ F and a · b ∈ F,
(ii) Commutative w.r.t. addition and multiplication: a + b = b + a and a · b = b · a,
(iii) Associative w.r.t. addition and multiplication: (a + b) + c = a + (b + c) and (a · b) · c = a · (b · c),
(iv) Distributivity holds on addition over multiplication: (a + b) · c = a · c + b · c.
Furthermore, for two elements 0 and 1 ∈ F where 0 , 1,
(v) a + 0 = a for all a ∈ F,
(vi) a · 1 = a and a · 0 = 0 for all a ∈ F,
(vii) For any a ∈ F, there exist an additive inverse element ‘−a’,
(viii) For a , 0 in F, there exists a multiplicative inverse element a−1 ∈ F such that a · a−1 = 1.
Example 1.1 Some common examples of fields include R (the set of real numbers), set of all rational numbers
Q, and the set of all complex numbers C. The set of irrationals does not satisfy axiom (i), hence it doesn’t form
a field, and the set of integers Z doesn’t satisfy axiom (viii), hence it is also not a field. Though, the set of
integers ‘modulo’ a prime number always form a field.
Definition 1.4 Let F be a field. The characteristic of F is the least positive integer ‘p’ such that ‘p · 1 = 0’,
where 1 is the multiplicative identity of F. If no such ‘p’ exists, we define the characteristic to be 0.
Theorem 1.1 The characteristic of a field is either 0 or a prime number.
Our main point of consideration would be fields which are finite. Finite fields have a specific algebraic
structure and have cardinality as power of a prime. A finite field of order 2 is denoted by F2 or GF(2).
Theorem 1.2 The set of integers ‘modulo m’ i.e., Zm forms a field if and only if ‘m’ is a prime number.
Theorem 1.3 Every finite field has order exactly a power of some prime number.
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1.2 Polynomial Rings over Finite Fields
Let F be a field; the set
F[x] :=
 n∑
i=0
aixi : ai ∈ F for 0 ≤ i ≤ n, and n ≥ 0

along with polynomial addition and multiplication forms a ring and is called the polynomial ring over F. The
elements of F[x] are called polynomials over F. The degree of a polynomial is the highest power of variable in
it.
A polynomial f (x) of positive degree is said to be reducible over F if there exist two polynomials g(x)
and h(x) over F such that 1 ≤ deg g(x), deg h(x) < deg f (x) and f (x) = g(x)h(x). If there does not exist such
polynomials in F[x], then f (x) is said to be irreducible over F.
Example 1.2 The polynomial f (x) = x4 + 2x6 ∈ Z3[x] is of degree 6 and, is reducible as f (x) = x4(1 + 2x2).
The polynomial g(z) = 1 + z + z2 ∈ Z2[z] is irreducible polynomial as there is no polynomial with acceptable
degree as a factor of it. The polynomials having degree two or three are reducible if they have any root in the
corresponding field.
We have the division algorithm, greatest common divisors, least common multiples etc. in these polynomial
rings. Since for each m > 1 of Z, the ring Zm = Z/ 〈m〉 is constructed, the similar relation holds for polynomial
rings too. For f (x) ∈ F[x] having degree n, we define the fraction (quotient) ring
F[x]
〈 f (x)〉 =
{
a0 + a1x + a2x2 + · · · + an−1xn−1 + 〈 f (x)〉 : for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, ai ∈ F
}
. (1)
Theorem 1.4 Let f (x) be a polynomial over a field F with degree ≥ 1. Then the ring F[x]/ 〈 f (x)〉 is a field if
and only if f (x) is an irreducible polynomial over F.
Example 1.3 The ring Z2[x]/
〈
1 + x + x2
〉
= {0, 1, x, 1 + x} is a field of order 22 = 4.
Generally, for a k degree irreducible polynomial f (x) ∈ F[x], where | F |= p, the field F[x]/ 〈 f (x)〉 is of
order pk. A finite field of order q, denoted by Fq, where q = pn for some prime p and a natural number n is
described as:
Fq =
Zp[x]
〈 f (x)〉
=
{
a0 + a1x + a2x2 + · · · + an−1xn−1 + 〈 f (x)〉 : for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}, ai ∈ Zp
}
(2)
where Zp[x] is a polynomial ring with variable x and the coefficients from Zp, and f (x) is an irreducible
polynomial of degree n over Zp.
An element α in a finite field Fq is called a primitive element (or generator) of Fq if Fq = {0, α, α2, . . . , αq−1}.
Consider the field F4 = F2[α], where α is a root of the irreducible polynomial 1 + x + x2 ∈ F2[x]. Then we have
α2 = −(1 + α) = 1 + α
α3 = α(α2) = α(1 + α) = α + α2 = α + 1 + α = 1.
From this, we see F4 = {0, α, 1 + α, 1} = {0, α, α2, α3}, so α is a primitive element of F4.
Lemma 1.1 The multiplicative order of any non-zero element α ∈ Fq divides q − 1. Further for any two
non-zero elements α, β ∈ Fq, if gcd(|α|, |β|) = 1, then |αβ| = |α| × |β|.
Theorem 1.5 A non-zero element of Fq is a primitive element if and only if its multiplicative order is q − 1;
moreover, every finite field has at least one primitive element.
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Primitive elements are not unique for any field, in general. A minimal polynomial of an element α ∈ Fqm
with respect to Fq is a unique non-zero monic polynomial f (x) of the least degree in Fq[x] such that f (α) = 0.
The minimal polynomial is always irreducible over the base field; and the roots of this polynomial are all
primitive elements of Fqm .
Definition 1.5 For n being a natural number, Fnq defines a set {(a1, a2, . . . , an) : ai ∈ Fq for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
Addition in Fnq is coordinate-wise. This set forms an n−dimensional vector space over Fq.
Let Fq be the finite field with q elements. A non-empty set V , together with some (vector) addition + and
scalar multiplication by elements of Fq, is a vector space over Fq if it satisfies the following conditions for all
u, v,w ∈ V and for all λ, µ ∈ Fq:
(i) u + v ∈ V;
(ii) (u + v) + w = u + (v + w);
(iii) there is an element 0 ∈ V with the property 0 + v = v + 0;
(iv) for each u ∈ V there is an element of V , called −u, such that u + (−u) = 0 = (−u) + u;
(v) u + v = v + u;
(vi) λv ∈ V;
(vii) λ(u + v) = λu + λv;
(viii) (λ + µ)u = λu + µu;
(ix) (λµ)u = λ(µu);
(x) if 1 is the multiplicative identity of Fq, then 1u = u.
In the following section, the term ‘messages’ will be a tuple of certain fixed size length with entries from
specified set/ field.
1.3 Basic Coding Theory
The objective of Coding Theory is the transmission of messages over noisy channels. The basic visualization
is designed as below:
Figure 1: Transmission over noisy channel
From this we see that if message m is transmitted and e is the error that occurred during transmission of m
and y is received by the receiver, then we have y = x + e. Here ‘+’ is coordinate-wise addition.
Definition 1.6 A block code C of length n is a subset of A n, where A is said to be the set of alphabets of
C . Generally, A is a finite field. A q-ary block code of length n is a given set of sequences of length n, of
symbols where each symbol is chosen from a finite field Fq. A block code of length n in which every codeword
is repitition of a single symbol is called a repetition code of length n.
Definition 1.7 The Hamming distance between any two vectors of Fnq, denoted by dH(x, y) := Number of
differences in digits of x and y. The Hamming weight wt(x) of the bit string x ∈ Fn2 is the number of nonzero
coordinates in x. The relation between distance and weight is wt(x) = d(x, 0). The Hamming distance of a
code C is defined as d(C ) := min{d(x, y) for all x, y ∈ C , with x , y}.
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For every element x of Fq, we can define Hamming weight as follows:
wt(x) = d(x, 0) =
{
1 if x , 0
0 if x = 0.
Theorem 1.6 The Hamming distance defines a metric on Fnq. If x, y ∈ Fnq, then d(x, y) = wt(x − y). As a
consequence of this, x and y being vectors in Fn2, dH(x, y) = wt(x + y). Equivalently, let q be even. If x, y ∈ Fnq,
then d(x, y) = wt(x+y). Furthermore, if x, y ∈ Fn2, then wt(x+y) = wt(x)+wt(y)−2wt(x?y), where ? represents
component-wise multiplication.
Definition 1.8 Encoding is defined as a function ‘Encode : {Messages set} −→ Code ⊆ A n’.
The Encoding function is not common in general. For an instance, suppose we have two messages: Yes
and No, then we can encode Yes → 1 and No → 0; but, in this case due to noise in channel if we intended to
transmit the message 1 and received 0 in response, there would be no clue to receiver that the original message
was 1. Considering the encoding based on majority bits decoding: Yes → 111 and No → 000 then upon error
in transmission up to one place in channel, the receiver can easily detect and correct the error. In latter case, the
code used is binary repetition code of length 3 over F2. In this case the decoded message is the majority bit.
This defines the general problem of Coding Theory: Error Detection and Correction.
Theorem 1.7 A code C can detect upto ‘s’ errors in any codeword if d(C ) ≥ s + 1 and it can correct upto ‘t’
errors in any codeword if d(C ) ≥ 2t + 1.
Definition 1.9 (Sphere) A sphere of radius r, centred about u ∈ Fnq is defined as:
S (u, r) := {v ∈ Fnq : d(u, v) ≤ r}.
Theorem 1.8 For some u ∈ Fnq and r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, S (u, r) contains exactly
(
n
0
)
+
(
n
1
)
(q− 1) +
(
n
2
)
(q− 1)2 + · · ·+(
n
r
)
(q − 1)r elements of Fnq.
Theorem 1.9 (Sphere Packing or Hamming Bound) If M is the number of codewords in a code C having
length ‘n’ over Fq with d(C ) ≥ 2t + 1, then we have:
M
((
n
0
)
+
(
n
1
)
(q − 1) +
(
n
2
)
(q − 1)2 + · · · +
(
n
t
)
(q − 1)t
)
≤ qn.
Definition 1.10 (Perfect Code) A code which satisfies equality in the sphere packing bound.
Example 1.4 Following are some examples of perfect codes.
(i) Binary repetition code of length 5,
(ii) Code consisting all elements of Fnq.
Theorem 1.10 (Plotkin construction : (u|u + v)) If C1 be some binary code of length n, having M1 code-
words, with d(C1) = d1, and C2 be some binary code of length n, having M2 codewords, with d(C2) = d2, then
the binary code C3 := {(u || u + v) : u ∈ C1, v ∈ C2} is a binary code of length 2n, with M1M2 codewords, and
d(C3) = min{2d1, d2}.
If we suppose for any natural number n, En be the set of vectors in Fn2 which have even weight. This,
together with Plotkin construction produces an interesting family of codes:
We begin by choosing C1 to be E4 and C2 to be binary repetition code of length 4, then using Plotkin
construction we get C3 and extending this type of construction with a binary repetition code of length 8. By
doing this construction time and again we get codes with length 2m, having 2m+1 codewords, and distance 2m−1
for m ≥ 2. These codes are known as the first-order Reed − Muller codes.
Theorem 1.11 Reed − Muller first order codes are optimal with those parameters, i.e., these codes achieve
Sphere-packing bound.
The IS BN (International Standard Book Number), a 10 digit number, say x1x2x3 · · · x10 is designed in such
a way that it satisfies
∑10
i=1 ixi ≡ 0(mod 11). This is called Weighted check sum. Using this, one can detect if
there is an error or not in IS BN.
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1.4 Linear Codes
Linear codes of length n over Fq are the subspaces of Fnq, thus the dimension of these subspaces is finite. Since
a linear code is a vector space, all its elements can be described in terms of a basis. We first recall some facts
from linear algebra. Knowing a basis for a linear code enables us to describe its codewords explicitly. In coding
theory, a basis for a linear code is often represented in the form of a matrix, called a generator matrix, while a
matrix that represents a basis for the dual code is called a parity-check matrix. These matrices play an important
role in coding theory.
Definition 1.11 (q−ary linear code) Let C be a k−dimensional subspace of Fnq then we say that C is a q-ary
[n, k] code; and if d(C ) = d, then C is a q-ary [n, k, d] code over Fq.
Lemma 1.2 A q−ary [n, k, d] code contains qk codewords. If x and y ∈ Fnq, then d(x, y) = w(x − y).
Theorem 1.12 Let C be a linear code and w(C ) be the smallest of weights out of the non-zero codewords of
C , then d(C ) = w(C ).
Definition 1.12 (Generator Matrix) The Generator Matrix for a q−ary linear [n, k] code C is a k × n matrix,
whose rows form the basis of vector space C over Fq.
Definition 1.13 (Parity Check Matrix) Let C be a q−ary linear [n, k] code with generator matrix G, then a
(n − k) × n matrix H is called a Parity Check matrix for C if G · HT = 0.
If C is an [n, k]−linear code, then a generator matrix for C must be a k×n matrix and a parity-check matrix
for C must be an (n − k) × n matrix.
As the number of bases for a vector space usually exceeds one, the number of generator matrices for a
linear code also usually exceeds one. Moreover, even when the basis is fixed, a permutation (different from the
identity) of the rows of a generator matrix also leads to a different generator matrix.
The rows of a generator matrix are linearly independent. The same holds for the rows of a parity-check
matrix. To show that a k × n matrix G is indeed a generator matrix for a given [n, k]−linear code C , it suffices
to show that the rows of G are codewords in C and that they are linearly independent. Alternatively, one may
also show that C is contained in the row space of G.
The family of linear codes having same parameters are divided into various Equivalence classes.
Definition 1.14 Any pair of linear codes are Equivalent if the generator matrix of one can be obtained from
other by either or the combination of the following:
• Permutation of rows,
• Multiplication of rows by a non-zero scalar,
• Addition of a scalar multiple of one row to another,
• Permutation of columns,
• Multiplication of any column by a non-zero scalar.
As we have divided the family of linear codes into equivalence classes, we now require a class represen-
tative. Supposing G to be the generator matrix for [n, k]-code C , on applying equivalence criteria, G can be
transformed to standard form:
Gk×n =
[
Ik | Ak×(n−k)]k×n .
Definition 1.15 A generator matrix of the form (Ik | X) is said to be in standard form. A parity-check matrix in
the form (Y | In−k) is said to be in standard form.
If G = (Ik | X) is the standard form generator matrix of an [n, k]−code C , then a parity-check matrix for
C is H = (−XT | In−k). It should be noted that it is not true that every linear code has a generator matrix in
standard form. The standard form for any code is not unique; it is unique up to Equivalence of codes.
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Example 1.5 The code C = {000, 001, 100, 101} is a 2−dimensional code and its generator matrix do not have
a standard form.
Lemma 1.3 Let C be an [n, k]−linear code over Fq, with generator matrix G. Then v ∈ Fnq belongs to C ⊥ if
and only if v is orthogonal to every row of G; i.e., v ∈ C ⊥ ⇐⇒ vGT = 0. In particular, given an (n − k) × n
matrix H, then H is a parity-check matrix for C if and only if the rows of H are linearly independent and
HGT = 0.
Theorem 1.13 Let C be a linear code and let H be a parity-check matrix for C . Then
(i) C has distance ≥ d if and only if any d − 1 columns of H are linearly independent; and
(ii) C has distance ≤ d if and only if H has d columns that are linearly dependent.
Corollary 1.13.1 Let C be a linear code and let H be a parity-check matrix for C . Then the following state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) C has distance d;
(ii) any d − 1 columns of H are linearly independent and H has d columns that are linearly dependent.
Example 1.6 En, being a linear code, is a [n, n − 1, 2]-code over F2, with generator matrix in standard form
as: 
1 0 0 · · · 0 1
0 1 0 · · · 0 1
0 0 1 · · · 0 1
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 0 · · · 1 1

Example 1.7 For H being an r × n matrix over Fq, the null space of linear transformation corresponding to H
is a linear [n, nullity(H)]-code over Fq. The matrix H is then the parity-check matrix for this code.
1.5 Encoding and Decoding with Linear Codes
Coding theory offers versatile linear codes which are employed to cater encoding and decoding of messages.
These can be regarded as invertible functions over vector spaces. The encoding and decoding processes are
described in the remaining component of this section.
1.6 Encoding Process
Let C be an [n, k, d]−linear code over the finite field Fq. Each codeword of C can represent one piece of
information, so C can represent qk distinct pieces of information. Suppose m = (m1,m2, . . . ,mk) is a message
in Fkq, then by encoding, we mean a one-to-one function
Encode : Fkq −→ Fnq
i.e., we append ‘n − k’ extra information bits to message m as
(m1,m2, . . . ,mk) 7→ (mˆ1, mˆ2, . . . , mˆk, ˆmk+1, . . . , mˆn︸         ︷︷         ︸
n−k redundancy bits
).
Let C be an [n, k]-code over Fq with generator matrix G. Then C contains qk codewords and thus C can be
used to communicate qk number of messages at a time. Encoding with a linear code can be done by multiplica-
tion of message vector with generator matrix of the linear code as m 7→ m ·G. The end vector m ·G is indeed
a codeword of C , as it is a linear combination of the rows of generator matrix. Encoding map is simpler when
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the generator matrix is given in standard form as [Ik|Ak×(n−k)].
Suppose the codeword x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is sent through the channel and that the vector y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn)
is received. We define error vector e as:
e = y − x = (e1, e2, . . . , en).
The decoder must decide from y which codeword x was transmitted, or equivalently what is corresponding
error vector e. This process is called decoding with a linear code, and is achieved with various methods:
nearest neighbor decoding, syndrome decoding, standard array decoding, etc.
We begin decoding by first looking at notion of a coset. Cosets play an essential role in many decoding
schemes.
Definition 1.16 Let C be a linear code of length n over Fq, and let u ∈ Fnq be any vector of length n; we define
the coset of C determined by u to be the set
C + u = {v + u : v ∈ C } = u + C .
Theorem 1.14 Let C be an [n, k, d]−linear code over the finite field Fq. Then,
(i) every vector of Fnq is contained in some coset of C ;
(ii) for all u ∈ Fnq, |C + u| = |C | = qk;
(iii) for all u, v ∈ Fnq,u ∈ C + v implies that C + u = C + v;
(iv) two cosets are either identical or they have empty intersection;
(v) there are qn−k different cosets of C ;
(vi) for all u, v ∈ Fnq,u − v ∈ C if and only if u and v are in the same coset.
Definition 1.17 A vector in a coset is called a coset leader if it has the minimum Hamming weight.
1.7 Nearest Neighbor Decoding
Let C be a linear code. Assume the codeword v is transmitted and the vector w is received, resulting in the error
vector e = w−v ∈ w+C . Then w−e = v ∈ C by axiom (vi), so the error vector e and the received vector w are
in the same coset. Since error vectors of small Hamming weight are the most likely to occur, nearest neighbor
decoding works for a linear code C in the following manner. Upon receiving the vector w, we choose a vector
e of least Hamming weight in the coset w +C and conclude that v = w− e was the codeword transmitted. This
process is executed as:
Let C = {c1, c2, · · · , ck} be a linear code over Fq of length n, and G be its generator matrix. A standard
array matrix is formed for the code C as follows:
Step (i): The first row of the matrix consists of the elements of C ,
Step (ii): Find a smallest weighted vector of Fnq which do not lie in first row (select any if more than one) say
a1, then the second row is the elements of the coset a1 + C ,
Step (iii): Repeat above process, taking the smallest weighted vector not lying in above rows till all the ele-
ments of Fnq are exhausted.
This matrix will consist all the elements of Fnq. Taking element of F
k
q as input, its encoding is done by post
multiplication with G. For decoding process, suppose the received vector is al + cw (looking in standard array),
then its decoding will be cw and al is the error.
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Example 1.8 Let C = 〈1011, 0101〉 be a linear code over F42, then the standard array of C is
C =

0000 1011 0101 1110
1000 0011 1101 0110
0100 1111 0001 1010
0010 1001 0111 1100
So if 0001 is received, the decoded message to this is 0101 with error vector 0100.
If the code has greater parameters, more computations would be required, which increases the complexity,
hence we have Syndrome decoding.
1.8 Syndrome Decoding
The decoding scheme based on the standard array works reasonably well when the length n of the linear code
is small, but it may take a considerable amount of time when n is large. Time can be saved by making use of
the syndrome to identify the coset to which the received vector belongs. For this, we need to understand a few
things first.
Definition 1.18 (Dual of a code) Given a linear code C over Fq, the dual code of C is defined as
C ⊥ := {v ∈ Fnq : u · v = 0 for all u ∈ C }.
The dot product used here is standard Euclidean dot product.
Theorem 1.15 The dual code of any linear code is also linear code over the same field. Further, if C is
[n, k]-code over Fq, then C ⊥ is [n, n − k]-code over Fq; also, (C ⊥)⊥ = C
Definition 1.19 A parity-check matrix H for an [n, k]-code C is a generator matrix for C ⊥.
Theorem 1.16 If G =
[
Ik|Ak×(n−k)]k×n is a generator matrix for some [n, k]-code C , then the generator matrix
for C ⊥ is H =
[
−AT(n−k)×k|In−k
]
(n−k)×n . This is the standard form of parity-check matrix for C .
Definition 1.20 (Syndrome of a vector) Let C be an [n, k, d]−linear code over Fq and let H be a parity-check
matrix for C . For any w ∈ Fnq, the syndrome of w is the word S (w) = wHT ∈ Fn−kq . (Strictly speaking, as the
syndrome depends on the choice of the parity-check matrix H, it is more appropriate to denote the syndrome
of w by S H(w) to emphasize this dependence. However, for simplicity of notation, the subscript H is dropped
whenever there is no risk of ambiguity.)
Remark 1.1 Let C be an [n, k, d]−linear code and let H be a parity-check matrix for C . For u, v ∈ Fnq, we
have
(i) S (u + v) = S (u) + S (v);
(ii) S (y) = 0 if and only if y ∈ C ;
(iii) S (u) = S (v) if and only if u and v are in the same coset of C .
A table which matches each coset leader with its syndrome is called a syndrome look-up table.
Steps to construct a Syndrome look-up table assuming complete nearest neighbor decoding:
Step (i): List all the cosets for the code, choose from each coset a word of least weight as coset leader u.
Step (ii): Find a parity-check matrix H for the code and, for each coset leader u, calculate its syndrome
S (u) = uHT .
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The Syndrome decoding works in same way as standard array decoding works. The Syndrome of received
vector is calculated and the coset leader of the row in which it lies is found by matching the syndrome of coset
leaders. This reduces the time of searching the row of standard array. The decoding procedure for Syndrome
decoding is as:
Step (i): For the received vector w, compute the syndrome S (w).
Step (ii): Find the coset leader u next to the syndrome S (w) = S (u) in the syndrome look-up table.
Step (iii): Decode w as v = w − u.
Unlike the above stated codes, we now focus on codes which are formulated and designed from another
crucial expect of encoding, which is the number of errors they can correct. Therefore, in next section, we
describe the algebraic structure of Goppa codes in which the error correcting capability corresponds to the
degree of the Goppa polynomial we select.
1.9 Goppa Codes
Born in 1939, a Soviet and Russian mathematician, Valery Denisovich Goppa, discovered the relation between
algebraic geometry and codes in 1970. This led to the idea of Goppa Codes. It turned out that Goppa codes
also form arguably the most interesting subclass of alternant codes, introduced by H. J. Helgert in 1974. These
codes have got efficient decoding algorithm by N. Patterson [22] in 1975.
Definition 1.21 Let g(z) = g0 + g1z + g2z2 + · · · + gtzt ∈ Fqm[z], and let L = {α1, α2, . . . , αn} ⊆ Fqm such that,
g(αi) , 0, for all αi ∈ L. Then the code defined byc = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ Fnq : n∑
i=1
ci
z − αi ≡ 0 mod g(z)

is called Goppa code with parameters g(z) and L; denoted by Γ(L, g(z)).
For each i (where 1 ≤ i ≤ n), g(αi) , 0 equivalently gcd(z − αi, g(z)) = 1, the fraction 1z−αi is computed in
Fqm [z]
〈g(z)〉 as
Theorem 1.17 The multiplicative inverse of (z − αi) exists in the quotient ring Fqm [z]〈g(z)〉 ; the value of (z − αi)−1 in
Fqm [z]
〈g(z)〉 is −
(
g(z)−g(αi)
z−αi
)
g(αi)−1. A vector c ∈ Γ(L, g) if and only if ∑i ci ( g(αi)−g(z)z−αi ) g(αi)−1 ≡ 0 (mod g(z)).
Using this result, we can derive the following most important corollary:
Corollary 1.17.1 A vector c ∈ Γ(L, g) if and only if ∑i ci (g(αi)−g(z)z−αi ) g(αi)−1 = 0 as a polynomial in Fqm[z].
Hence, we derive the Parity check matrix over Fqm for the Goppa codes as:
Corollary 1.17.2 For a Goppa code Γ(L, g(z)), the Parity check matrix over Fqm is H
=

gtg(α1)−1 gtg(α2)−1 · · · gtg(αn)−1
(gtα1 + gt−1)g(α1)−1 (gtα2 + gt−1)g(α2)−1 · · · (gtαn + gt−1)g(αn)−1
...
...
...
...
(gtαt−11 + · · · + g1)g(α1)−1 (gtαt−12 + · · · + g1)g(α2)−1 · · · (gtαt−1n + · · · + g1)g(αn)−1
 .
This matrix is further broken down into product of three matrices as:
H =

gt 0 · · · 0
gt−1 gt · · · 0
...
...
...
...
g1 g2 · · · gt
︸                      ︷︷                      ︸
C

1 1 · · · 1
α1 α2 · · · αn
...
...
...
...
αt−11 α
t−1
2 · · · αt−1n
︸                            ︷︷                            ︸
X

g(α1)−1 0 · · · 0
0 g(α2)−1 · · · 0
...
...
...
...
0 0 · · · g(αn)−1
︸                                          ︷︷                                          ︸
Y
.
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Now, as we have c ∈ Γ(L, g) if and only if cHT = 0, which implies c(CXY)T = 0, equivalently cYT XTCT =
0, and this gives cYT XT = 0, or c(XY)T = 0 (as matrix C is invertible).
Remark 1.2 The matrix XY can be viewed as Parity check matrix for Γ(L, g) over Fqm . The matrix
XY =

g(α1)−1 g(α2)−1 · · · g(αn)−1
α1g(α1)−1 α2g(α2)−1 · · · αng(αn)−1
...
...
...
...
αt−11 g(α1)
−1 αt−12 g(α2)
−1 · · · αt−1n g(αn)−1

t×n
.
Remark 1.3 Viewing elements of Fqm as vectors of length ‘m’ over Fq by vector space isomorphism, we have a
Parity check matrix for Γ(L, g) over Fq to be an ‘mt × n’ matrix, with at least ‘t’ columns linearly independent
over Fq. Hence, the Hamming distance of Goppa Code, d(Γ(L, g)) ≥ t + 1. Since, for the matrix XY over Fq,
maximum of ‘mt’ rows are linearly independent, hence, Rank(XY) ≤ mt, which gives Nullity(XY) ≥ n − mt.
Therefore, dimension of Goppa code, dimFqΓ(L, g) ≥ n − mt.
Definition 1.22 (Primitive Polynomial) An irreducible polynomial ‘p(x)’ of degree ‘m’ over Fq is called prim-
itive polynomial if its roots form primitive elements of Fqm .
For example p(x) = x13 + x4 + x3 + x + 1 is a primitive polynomial of degree 13 over binary field F2.
Remark 1.4 There are φ(q
n−1)
n primitive polynomials of degree ‘n’ over Fq. In construction of Goppa codes,
the extension field is constructed taking modulo a primitive polynomial.
Example 1.9 (A Goppa Code) Let F24 be the field isomorphic to
F2[x]〈x4+x+1〉 . Let ‘α’ be a root of x4 + x + 1, then,
since multiplicative order of ‘α’ is 15, it can be used to generate all elements of F∗24; equivalently, F
∗
24 = 〈α〉.
Hence we can represent elements of F24 as
0 = = (0, 0, 0, 0)T ;
1 = 1 = (1, 0, 0, 0)T ;
α = α = (0, 1, 0, 0)T ;
α2 = α2 = (0, 0, 1, 0)T ;
α3 = α3 = (0, 0, 0, 1)T ;
α4 = 1+ α = (1, 1, 0, 0)T ;
α5 = α+ α2 = (0, 1, 1, 0)T ;
α6 = α2+ α3 = (0, 0, 1, 1)T ;
α7 = 1+ α+ α3 = (1, 1, 0, 1)T ;
α8 = 1+ α2 = (1, 0, 1, 0)T ;
α9 = α+ α3 = (0, 1, 0, 1)T ;
α10 = 1+ α+ α2 = (1, 1, 1, 0)T ;
α11 = α+ α2+ α3 = (0, 1, 1, 1)T ;
α12 = 1+ α+ α2+ α3 = (1, 1, 1, 1)T ;
α13 = 1+ α2+ α3 = (1, 0, 1, 1)T ;
α14 = 1+ α3 = (1, 0, 0, 1)T ;
Consider the Goppa Code Γ(L, g(z)) defined by
g(z) = (z + α)(z + α14) = z2 + α7z + 1,
L = {αi | 2 ≤ i ≤ 13}.
Now, in order to find the Parity check matrix of Γ(L, g(z)), we need to compute g(α2)−1 = (α4 + α9 + 1)−1 =
((0, 0, 0, 1)T )−1 = α12, and similarly, other entries to compute H as described in Remark 1.2.
H =
(
α9 α10 α9 α14 α6 0 α10 α8 α2 α7 α14 α6
α12 α6 α6 α α11 1 α14 α8 α11 α14 α12 α
)
.
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The entries can be observed as binary vectors of length 4 using the table described above. This is given by:
H =

0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0

.
Then, the Null-space of H produces generator matrix of Γ(L, g(z)). Hence the generator matrix G becomes:
G =

1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
 .

1.10 Encoding with Goppa Codes
Let Γ(L, g(z)) be a Goppa code, where g(z) is some primitive polynomial with deg(g(z)) = t and |L| = n. Let
dimFq(Γ(L, g(z))) = k, and G be ‘k × n’ sized generator matrix for respective Goppa code; then encoding of a
k-length message vector m over Fq is mG.
1.11 Correction of errors/ Syndrome decoding of Goppa codes
Let the vector y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn) be received with ‘r’ number of errors, where ‘2r + 1 ≤ d’ (for maximum
number of error correction). Let L = {α1, α2, . . . , αn},
y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn) = (c1, c2, . . . , cn)︸           ︷︷           ︸
codeword
+ (e1, e2, . . . , en)︸           ︷︷           ︸
error vector
with ei , 0 at exactly r-places. We need to
• locate positions of error (say B = {i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n and ei , 0});
• find the corresponding error values (values of ei : i ∈ B).
In order to find these, we define two polynomials
Definition 1.23 Error locater polynomial σ(z) and Error evaluator polynomial w(z)
• σ(z) :=
∏
B(z − αi) (this is a ‘r’ degree polynomial);
• w(z) :=
∑
i∈B ei
∏
j∈B; j,i(z − α j) (this is a ‘r − 1’ degree polynomial).
Definition 1.24 Syndrome of received vector y is defined as S (y) where:
S (y) :=
∑n
i=1
yi
z−αi
=
∑n
i=1
ci
z−αi +
∑
i∈B
ei
z−αi
=
∑
i∈B
ei
z−αi mod (g(z)).
Proposition 1.1 Let e be the error vector having weight r : r ≤
⌊
t
2
⌋
. Let σ(z),w(z) and S (y) be as described
above. Then the following properties hold:
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(i) deg(σ(z)) = r;
(ii) deg(w(z)) ≤ r − 1;
(iii) gcd(σ(z),w(z)) = 1;
(iv) ek = w(αk)/σ′(αk), where k ∈ B and σ′ represents derivative of σ;
(v) σ(z)S (y) ≡ w(z) (mod g(z)).
Error-correction: Algorithm for correcting r ≤
⌊
t
2
⌋
errors in a Goppa code:
Step (i): Compute the syndrome
S (y) =
n∑
i=1
yi
z − αi ,
Step (ii): Solve the key equation
σ(z)S (y) ≡ w(z) (mod g(z)),
by writing
σ(z) = σ0 + σ1z + · · · + σr−1zr−1 + zr,
w(z) = w0 + w1z + · · · + wr−1zr−1,
and solve for t equations and 2r unknowns.
If the code is binary, take w(z) = σ′(z),
Step (iii): Determine the set of error locations B = {i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n and σ(αi) = 0},
Step (iv): Compute the error values ei =
w(αi)
σ′(αi) for all i ∈ B,
Step (v): The error vector e = (e1, e2, . . . , en) is defined by ei for i ∈ B and zeros elsewhere,
Step (vi): The codeword sent is calculated as c = y − e.
1.12 Patterson’s Algorithm for Error Correction
The patterson algorithm decodes only binary Goppa codes. It computes the syndrome S (y) of a received vector
and then solves the key equation σ(z)S (y) ≡ w(z) (mod g(z)) with w(z) = σ′(z) by heavily exploiting the
requirement that the code is binary. The error locater polynomial can be split in even and odd powers of z such
that σ(z) = a2(z) + zb2(z), as field has characteristic 2.
The Patterson algorithm can be described as below:
Input: The received vector y and the Goppa code Γ(L, g).
Step (i): Compute syndrome S (y) an element of Fqm [z]〈g(z)〉
Step (ii): Compute T (z) = S (y)−1 mod g(z)
Step (iii): Compute P(z) =
√
T (z) + z mod g(z)
Step (iv): Compute u(z) and v(z) with u(z) = v(z)S (y) mod g(z)
Step (v): Compute the locater polynomial σ(z) = u(z)2 + zv(z)2
Step (vi): Find the roots of σ(z)
Step (vii): Find error positions, i.e., error vector e
Output: The error vector e.
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1.13 Decoding the Message after Discovering the Codeword
After correcting possible errors in a codeword, one can find the message sent by recalling that
(m1,m2, . . . ,mk) ·G = (c1, c2, . . . , cn),
equivalently,
GT ·

m1
...
mk
 =

c1
...
cn
 ,
to find the message vector (m1,m2, . . . ,mk), one reduces above system to

c1
GT
...
cn
 ∼ · · · ∼

m1
Ik
...
mk
P

Example 1.10 Let F32 be the field corresponding to the primitive polynomial x2 − x − 1 over the base field F3
and let ‘α’ be one of its root. Then we have
0 = = (0, 0)T ;
1 = 1 = (1, 0)T ;
α = α = (0, 1)T ;
α2 = 1 +α = (1, 1)T ;
α3 = 1 −α = (1,−1)T ;
α4 = −1 = (−1, 0)T ;
α5 = −α = (0,−1)T ;
α6 = −1 −α = (−1,−1)T ;
α7 = −1 +α = (−1, 1)T ;
Consider the Goppa code Γ(L, g(z)) defined by
g(z) = z(z − α7) = z2 + α3z,
L = {αi : 0 ≤ i ≤ 6}.
Then the Parity check matrix over F3(α) will be
H =
(
α4 α3 α2 α 1 α7 α6
α6 α3 α6 α2 α3 α5 α5
)
;
Equivalently, the Parity check matrix over F3 will be
H =

−1 1 1 0 1 −1 −1
0 −1 1 1 0 1 −1
−1 1 −1 1 1 0 0
−1 −1 −1 1 −1 −1 −1
 .
This gives the generator matrix as
G =
 −1 0 −1 1 0 0 0−1 0 −1 0 1 1 0−1 1 −1 0 0 0 1
 .
The parameters of this code are [7, 3,≥ 3]. Now, let the message m = (0, 0, 0) be sent. Firstly, encoding of this
vector will be c = mG = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0). Suppose that the vector y = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,−1) is received having
one error. Our aim is to find the error vector.
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(i) Syndrome
S (y) =
6∑
i=1
yi
z − αi =
−1
z − α6 ≡ α
2 + αz mod g(z),
(ii) Substituting σ(z) = σ0 + z and then computing σ(z)S (y) mod z2 + α3z gives
σ(z)S (y) = (σ0 + z)(α2 + αz)
= σ0α
2 + (α2 + ασ0)z + αz2
≡ α2σ0 + (α2 + ασ0α4)z
= α2σ0 + (α7 + ασ0)z
Thus, for w(z) = w0, we get the system of equations by comparing coefficients of σ(z)S (y) ≡ w(z)
mod g(z) as: {
w0 = α2σ0,
0 = α7 + ασ0.
The solution to this system is σ0 = α2,w0 = α4 and hence σ(z) = z + α2 and w(z) = α4.
(iii) The root of σ(z) is α6 = α7, thus the set of error locations is
B = {i |σ(αi) = 0} = {7}.
(iv) The error value e7 = α
4
1 = α
4 = −1.
(v) The codeword sent must have been
c = y − e = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0).
Then the original message can be found out solving the augmented system
[
GT
∣∣∣∣∣ cT ], which results (0, 0, 0).
With this, we now proceed to cryptographic applications of coding theory in the coming sections.
2 Code-based Cryptography
The birth of code-based cryptography was inspired by the work of Robert J. McEliece in 1978. He was the first
one to implement the use of binary Goppa codes to develop code-based public key cryptosystem. There are
several reasons why Goppa codes are the primary choice for the McEliece cryptosystem. First of all, Goppa
codes have a fast polynomial time decoding algorithm. Another reason is that Goppa codes are “easy to generate
but hard to find”. Any irreducible polynomial over a finite field F2m can be used to create a Goppa code, but the
generator matrices of Goppa codes are nearly random.
For any fixed length n, there are many different Goppa codes. Though the exact number of Goppa codes,
given length n of the code and degree t of the Goppa polynomial, is not known, Ryan and Fitzpatrick [14]
found a way to calculate upper bounds, which are exact for some of the small parameters. For example,
the upper bound for the number of Goppa codes of length 128 which are able to correct at least 10 errors is
1037499670492467 ≈ 1.04 × 1015, while the upper bound for Goppa codes of the same length able to correct
at least 15 errors is 23765478069520611201643781 ≈ 2.38 × 1025. In fact, the number of Goppa codes grows
exponentially with the length of the code and the degree of the generating polynomial [14]. Goppa codes are
still the primary family of codes used with the McEliece cryptosystem.
Following to this, Niederreiter used parity check matrix of the Generalized Reed-Solomon codes as public
key to develop public key cryptosystem. Pursuing the same way, came use of Reed Solomon, BCH codes, Reed-
Muller codes, all of whose security reduced to standard hard problem of coding theory, which we will describe
in this section. Majority of these variants were broken or lack the security proof. Hamming Quasi Cycic (QC),
Quasi-Cyclic Moderate density parity-check (QC-MDPC), Rank mertic, LRPC codes based schemes also form
code-based cryptosystems.
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2.1 Cryptosystems
Essentially, there are two types of code-based cryptosystems, upon whose structure dwells all other cryptosys-
tems in this class. The first system is the McEliece Cryptosystem, in which the generating matrix of the Goppa
code is hidden by scrambling and permuting the entries of that matrix, and making it public. The ciphertext
is generated by encoding message with the matrix available in public key and x-oring with some small weight
error, depending on parameters of Goppa code. The second system is the Niederreiter cryptosystem, in which
message is random small weighted error vector. The public key becomes the scrambled-permuted parity check
matrix of Generalized Reed Solomon (GRS) code. Niederreiter’s proposed GRS codes were shown to be a bad
choice in his cryptosystem by Sidelnikov, Shestakov [26], but Goppa codes were found to be working fine.
Since a large public key size is one of the drawbacks of code-based cryptosystems, there have been many
proposals attempting to reduce the key size. Examples of this include Quasi-cyclic, (QC) as well as low density
parity check (QC-LDPC) codes. Recently, there have been several publications on structural attacks against
such highly structured codes. Otmani et al. [21] cryptanalysed a McEliece cryptosystem based on QC-LDPC
codes. The attack exploits the QC structure to find some version of the secrret key, then uses Stern’s algorithm to
reconstruct the entire secret key. Faigre et al. presented an algebraic attack against the McEliece cryptosystem
using non-binary QC codes at Eurocrypt 2010. The attacker sets up a system of algebraic equations, the solution
of which will be an alternant decoder for the underlying code. While this system can’t be solved efficiently for
the original McEliece cryptosystem, the additional QC structure allows to significantly reduce the number of
unknowns of this system.
In 2010, Faugre et al. presented a Goppa code distinguisher, which allows to distinguish a goppa code from
random codes, provided the code rate is very high (code rate is dimension of code divided by the code length).
This is useful for security proof of such a cryptosystem.
2.2 Hard Problems in Coding Theory
The general problems of coding theory which describes the security behind code-based cryptosystems are listed
below.
Problem 1. General Decoding Problem: Given an [n, k] code C over Fq, an integer t0 and a vector c ∈ Fnq,
find a codeword x ∈ C with d(x, c) ≤ t0.
Problem 2. Syndrome Decoding (SD) Problem: Given a matrix H and a vector s, both over Fq, and a non-
negative integer t0; find a vector x ∈ Fnq with Hamming weight wt(x) = t0 such that HxT = sT .
These problems were proved to be NP-complete in 1978 by Berlekamp et al. [7] for binary codes
and in 1997 by Alexander Barg [2] for codes over all finite fields.
Problem 3. Goppa Parameterized Syndrome Decoding (GPSD): Given a binary matrix H of size 2m×r and
a syndrome s, decide whether there exists a codeword x of weight r/m such that HxT = sT .
This problem is also an NP-complete problem, proof of which was given by Finiasz [1]
Problem 4. Goppa Code Distinguishing (GD): Given an r×n matrix H, decide whether H is the parity check
matrix of a Goppa code.
In 2013, Faugre - Gauthier - Umaa - Otmani - Perret - Tillich [12] showed that “high rate” binary
Goppa codes can be distinguished from random linear codes. However it does not work at
• 8 errors for n = 1024 (where McEliece used 50 errors)
• 20 errors for n = 8192 (a variant of classic mceliece).
2.3 Information-Set Decoding
An attacker who got hold of an encrypted message y has two possibilities in order to retrieve the original
message m.
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• Find out the secret code; i.e., find the generating matrix G given public key Gˆ which is scrambled-
permuted generating matrix, or
• Decode y without knowing an efficient decoding algorithm for the public code given by Gˆ.
Attacks of the first type are called structural attacks. If G or an equivalently efficiently decodable repre-
sentation of the underlying code can be retrieved in sub-exponential time, this code should not be used in the
McEliece cryptosystem. Suitable codes are such that the best known attacks are decoding random codes. We
will describe how to correct errors in a random-looking code with no obvious structure
Definition 2.1 (Information Set) Let G be a generator matrix of a [n, k]−linear code, I be a subset of {1, . . . , n}
and GI be the k × k sub-matrix of G defined by the columns of G with indices from I. If GI is invertible then I
is an information set.
An equivalent definition from parity check matrix point of view: Using a parity-check matrix H, an infor-
mation set I implies the non-singularity of the sub-matrix formed by the columns with indices {1, 2, . . . , n} \ I.
The description in terms of parity-check matrices, although less intuitive, favors the explanation on how ISD
algorithms work.
Information-set decoding (ISD) induces a generic attack against all code based cryptosystems regardless
of our current scheme. The basic ISD algorithm was given by Prange [25] with improvements by Leon [17],
Lee-Brickell [16], Stern [27] and Canteaut-Chabaud [9].
An attacker does not know the secret code and thus has to decode a random-looking code without any
obvious structure. The best known algorithms which do not exploit any code structure rely on information-set
decoding, an approach introduced by Prange. The idea is to find a set of coordinates of a garbled vector which
are error-free (i.e., an Information-Set, as defined above) and such that the restriction of the code’s generator
matrix to these positions is invertible. Then, the original message can be computed by multiplying the encrypted
vector by the inverse of the submatrix.
3 McEliece Cryptosystem
Recent public-key cryptography is largely based on number theory problems, such as factoring or computing
discrete logarithm. These systems constitute an excellent choice in many applications, and their security is well
defined and understood. One of the major drawbacks, though, is that they will be vulnerable once quantum
computers of an appropriate size are available. There is then a strong need for alternative systems that would
resist attackers equipped with quantum technology.
With the development of Quantum Computers, the risk to present day cryptography is increasing. The
coming scenario to cryptographic world relies upon Post-Quantum Cryptosystems, or we can say Quantum
resistant cryptosystems. Coding Theory based encryption systems are one kind of cryptosystems that are able
to resist quantum computing, and this provides an area in Post-Quantum Cryptography.
Robert J. McEliece (born 1942) is a mathematician and engineering professor at Caltech. He was the 2004
recipient of Claude E. Shanon Award and the 2009 recipient of the IEEE Alexander Graham Bell Medal. He
gave the notion of code-based cryptography and developed the public key cryptosystem based on binary Goppa
codes in 1978, namely McEliece cryptosystem.
The general idea of security behind this cryptosystem is the hardness in decoding a random linear code
(Problem 1). Except for the choice of parameters, this cryptosystem is unbroken till now. While the huge size
of key remains an issue, yet it is fair enough to prove efficient encryption system. This system did not get that
esteem which other cryptosystems of that time have got due to handling of keys issue. When Shor’s algorithm
appeared to impact number theory based cryptosystems, the value of code-based cryptosystems ascended and
McEliece cryptosystem being the oldest one in that cluster got the significant research.
In this section we describe the McEliece cryptosystem in detail, covering its weaknesses and applications.
To be accurate, this cryptosystem is a code-based system and the underlying code is the famous Goppa code.
In the following sections, we fix the parameters of Goppa code as:
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n : length of the code;
k : the dimension of code over the field Fq;
t : the degree of Goppa polynomial.
The original version of McEliece cryptosystem given by Robert J. McEliece[19], based on binary Goppa codes
in the year 1978 is described as follows. The values of n, k and t are publicly available parameters, but L, g, P
and S are randomly generated secrets. Then, this public-key cryptosystem work as follows:
Step 1: Firstly Alice generates a public and private key pair depending upon publicly available values. During
this,
(i) Alice selects a binary [n, k]-Goppa code, with its ‘k × n’ sized generator matrix G, capable of
correcting ‘t’ errors;
(ii) She then selects a random ‘k × k’ binary non-singular matrix S and a ‘n × n’ permutation matrix
P;
(iii) She computes the ‘k × n’ matrix Gˆ = S ·G · P;
(iv) She publishes her public key :
(
Gˆ, t
)
;
(v) She keeps her private key : (S ,G, P).
Step 2: Suppose Bob has to send an encrypted message to Alice:
(i) Bob has a binary plaintext-message m of length ‘k’;
(ii) He loads the public key of Alice :
(
Gˆ, t
)
;
(iii) He generates a random n-bit vector z with Hamming weight ‘t’;
(iv) Bob computes the ciphertext c = m · Gˆ + z and sends to Alice.
Step 3: Suppose Alice have received the ciphertext c. She decrypts the received ciphertext as:
(i) Alice computes P−1 using her private key;
(ii) Post multiplication by P−1, she computes c · P−1 = m · S ·G + z · P−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
this has weight t
;
(iii) Finally, she uses the decoding algorithm (Patterson’s algorithm) of Goppa codes for the secret
Goppa code to determine the value of m.
There are a number of decoding algorithms for Goppa codes. In usual, Patterson’s decoding algorithm is
followed as it make use of binary irreducible Goppa codes
3.1 Information-Set Decoding Attack
At PQCrypto 2008, several speed ups for ISD techniques were proposed by Bernstein et al.[5] which led
improvements in reducing the cost to attack the original McEliece parameters (1024, 524, 50) to 260.5 binary
operations. Finiasz and Sendrier [1] presented a further improvement which could be combined with the im-
provements in [5] but did not analyse the combined attack. It was proved in [5] that to obtain a 128-bit security,
the Goppa codes must have length 2960 and dimension 2288 with a degree-56 Goppa polynomial and 57 added
errors.
Let Gˆ be the public key of McEliece cryptosystem. Then, for a message m, ciphertext c is obtained as
m · Gˆ + e; equivalently, we have:
m · Gˆ + e = m1×k · (G1,G2, · · · ,Gn)k×n + (e1, e2, · · · , en)1×n
= (mG1,mG2, · · · ,mGn) + (e1, e2, · · · , en)
= (mG1 + e1,mG2 + e2, · · · ,mGn + en)
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where, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,Gi represents ith−column of the Scrambled-Permuted generated matrix of the code which
is the given public key matrix.
Here, a critical point is that the Hamming weight of error vector wt(e) = t which is very small as compared to
the block length of code. This means only t out of n coordinates of e are non-zero. Apparently, if a cryptanalyst
could guess ‘k’ out of ‘n − t’ coordinates from c that corresponds to ‘0’ at that coordinate of e, then the
restriction to those ‘k’ columns of c and the Public key Gˆ is observed as: c = m · Gˆ. For such an instance,
suppose {i1, i2, . . . , ik} ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n} be such that for each 1 ≤ j ≤ k, ei j = 0. Then, upon considering the
restriction of public key on these indices we arrive at:
(ci1 , ci2 , . . . , cik )1×k︸                 ︷︷                 ︸
c
= m1×k · (Gi1 ,Gi2 , · · · ,Gik)k×k︸                     ︷︷                     ︸
Gˆ
This means, if the ‘k × k’ sized matrix Gˆ is invertible, then the message m can be recovered by just post
multiplying by inverse of Gˆ. It comes out to be that it requires
(
n
k
)/(
n−t
k
)
number of guesses to succeed and the
work factor comes to be
k3 ·
(
n
k
)(
n−t
k
) ≈ k3 (1 − t
n
)−k
where k3 is cost of inverting a k × k matrix. The original parameters proposed in McEliece cryptosystem are:
Length of the code n : 1024,
The binary extension field F2m : F210 i.e., m = 10,
The degree t of Goppa polynomial : 50,
The dimension k of the Goppa code : k = n − mt = 524.
For original parameters of McEliece cryptosystem, the work factor to find an information set comes out to
be:
∼ 1.9 × 1024 ' 279.7.
Hence it is not an appropriate algorithm to perform such an attack.
Looking from another perspective that the public key Gˆ is again a generator matrix for some code with
minimum distance at least 2t + 1. We consider two cases for two messages u and u′.
Case (i): If u , u′, then d(uGˆ,u′Gˆ) > 2t, i.e., wtH(uGˆ + uGˆ) > 2t. Now if wt(e) = t, we have wtH(u′Gˆ +
uGˆ + e) > t.
Case (ii): If u = u′, then uGˆ = u′Gˆ. Now if wt(e) = t, we have wtH(u′Gˆ + uGˆ + e) = t.
From this, Eavesdropper upon receiving a ciphertext c = uGˆ + e, guesses a message u′ and checks
wt(u′Gˆ + c). It this is not equal to t, then he makes sure that u , u′. If the error vector e was chosen in such a
way that wt(e) ≤ t. Then also the similar arguments work providing eavesdropper now checks wt(u′Gˆ + c) ≤ t.
There are many improvements for this attacks, and a few algorithms which execute this attack more effectively:
Lee-Brickell’s algorithm and Stern’s algorithm.
The Lee-Brickell algorithm to recover error vector e from original McEliece cryptosystem using Informa-
tion set decoding is explained as:
Input : A generator matrix G, a ciphertext y∈ Fnq and a parameter p ∈ N.
Output : An error vector e of weight t.
Step (i) Choose a random information set I of size k and compute yI ,GI choosing corresponding columns of
G and G′ = G−1I G if inverse exists.
Step (ii) Calculate y′ = y − yIG′I .
Step (iii) For each size-p subset {a1, . . . , ap} ⊂ I, for each x1, x2, . . . , xp ∈ Fq \ {0}, compute the vector gˆ =∑p
i=1 xiG
′
ai
Step (iv) Set e = y′ − gˆ. If wt(e) = t then return e.
Step (v) Go back to step (i).
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We indicate with G′j the row of G
′ where there is a 1 in position j. Note that, by definition, this is unique if
j is an element of an information set.
The minimum work factor for this implementation comes out to be ' 273.4 for original parameters set. In
[24], Peters generalised Stern’s and Lee-Brickell’s algorithms (both are variants of ISD attacks) on Fq.
Subsequently, we have generalized Stern’s algorithm, ball collision decoding algorithm by Bernstein, Lange
and Peters, Sendrier’s Decoding One Out of Many algorithm, and many more. It is to be noted that this is a per-
message attack; the secret key of the system still remains unknown to the cryptanalyst. The last improvement
of this algorithm refers to Kruk [15], who proposed a solution to reduce its complexity, thus obtaining a work
factor equal to 259 for the original parameters.
The above process is demonstrated in MATLAB and is achieved with help of a few examples. The code
can be referred from Appendix.
3.2 Message-Resend or Related message attack
Suppose that the sender encrypted a message m twice and two ciphertexts are generated{
c1 = m · S ·G · P + e1
c2 = m · S ·G · P + e2
where e1 , e2. This is called message-resend condition. In this case it is easy for the cryptanalyst to recover m
from the above system. As same message is encrypted twice, we say resend depth is 2 in this case. Let c j(i) be
ith coordinate of c j, then
L0 := {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : c1(i) + c2(i) = e1(i) + e2(i) = 0};
L1 := {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : c1(i) + c2(i) = e1(i) + e2(i) = 1}.
• l ∈ L0 means either e1(l) = 0 = e2(l) or e1(l) = 1 = e2(l). Assuming the event of choosing error vectors
are independent, we have
Pr (e1(l) = 1 = e2(l)) =
( t
n
)2
.
For the case of original parameters of McEliece cryptosystem, it is (50/1024)2 ≈ 0.0024. So, when we
consider l ∈ L0, most significant is the case when e1(l) = 0 = e2(l); equivalently, neither c1(l) nor c2(l) is
garbled by error vectors.
• l ∈ L1 certainly means one of c1(l) or c2(l) is garbled by error vector.
Now our aim is to approximate the probability of guessing k ungarbled columns from those indexed by L0.
Let pm be the probability that precisely m coordinates are garbled by e1 and e2. Then
pm = Pr (|{i : e1(i) = 1} ∩ {i : e2(i) = 1}| = i) =
(
t
i
)(
n−k
t−i
)(
n
t
)
Therefore, the expected cardinality of L1 is
E(|L1|) =
t∑
m=0
(2t − 2m)pm
since every i for which e1(i) = 1 = e2(i) reduces |L1| by two.
For McEliece cryptosystem’s original parameters set, this comes out to be ≈ 95.1.
For example, suppose |L1| = 94. Then |L0| = 1024 − 94 = 930, of which |L0| × 0.0024 ≈ 3 are garbled. We
have the probability of guessing 5413 ungarbled columns from those indexed by L0 is(
927
524
)(
930
524
) ≈ 0.0828.
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So the cryptanalyst expects to succeed in this case with only 12 guesses, at a cost of 12 × 5243 ≈ 1010. These
results are a factor of 1015 better than exhaustive information-set decoding attack as analyzed above.
The conclusions of the literature are that information set decoding is an efficient method of attacking the
McEliece system but that from a practical viewpoint the system is unbreakable provided the code is long
enough. Bernstein et al. [5] give recommended code lengths and their corresponding security, as described
below.
Length n of code Weight t of error vector Security (in bits)
512 21 33.0
1024 38 57.9
2048 69 103.5
4096 127 187.9
8192 234 344.6
16384 434 637.4
3.3 Keys Allocation
Public Key : • The k × n sized matrix Gˆ.
Private Keys : • The matrices S and P of sizes k × k and n × n resp.;
• The t−degree Goppa polynomial g(z) over F2m , and
• The set L = {α1, α2, . . . , αn} ⊆ F2m .
The parameters provided in original construction were:
n : 1024 = 210
t : 50
m : 10
k : n − mt = 524
As per given arguments, the size of public key is:
kn = 524 × 1024 = 536576 bits
≈ 66 KB; and
The size of private key is:
(k2 + n2) + (t × m) + (n × m) = (274576 + 1048576) + 500 + 10240 = 1333892 bits
≈ 162.8 KB.
As the key size in this scheme is very large, Niederreiter proposed the dual variant of McEliece cryptosys-
tem. In that scheme, he made use of dual of the Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes, i.e., the parity-check
matrix in order to decrease the key size, maintaining same structure.
4 Niederreiter Cryptosystem
We describe a variant of the McEliece Cryptosystem published by Harald Niederreiter in 1986 [20]. Originally
this system used GRS codes, which later turned out to be not a suitable choice as the presence of structural
attack on them as shown by Sidelnikov and Shestakov [26] in 1992; then came another Niederreiter’s system
with the same Goppa codes as used by McEliece. It had the same security as McEliece’s system, as shown in
[31]. Niederreiter’s system differs from McEliece’s system in public-key structure, encryption mechanism, and
decryption mechanism. In this section, we
The sizes n, k and t are public system parameters, but g, P and S are randomly generated secrets.
Step 1: Firstly Alice generates a public and private key pair depending upon publicly available values. During
this,
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(i) Alice selects at random a ‘n × n’ sized permutation matrix P;
(ii) A non-singular ‘(n − k) × (n − k)’ sized matrix S ;
(iii) A parity-check matrix H of size ‘(n − k) × n’ for a Goppa code Γ(L, g) of dimension k = n − mt,
where L = {α1, α2, . . . , αn} and g is a Goppa polynomial of degree t over Fqm ;
(iv) Publishes her Public key : The (n − k) × n matrix S · H · P;
(v) Keeps her Private key : The matrices P, S and H.
Step 2: Suppose Bob has to send a message to Alice:
(i) Bob has a message m of length ‘n’ and Hamming weight ‘t’;
(ii) Computes and send the ciphertext c = S · H · P ·mT .
Step 3: Suppose Alice receives the ciphertext c:
(i) By linear algebra, she finds z such that HzT = S −1c;
(ii) Applies Patterson’s algorithm for decoding of Goppa codes on the vector z to get the codeword
z −m · PT , error vector m · PT and thereby m.
Theorem 4.1 ([7]) If H ∈ Fk×n2 and He ∈ Fn−k2 (with wt(e) ≤ t) are known, then finding the vector e ∈ Fn2 with
‘wt(e) ≤ t’ is NP complete. Equivalently, general syndrome decoding problem is NP-complete. (Hard problems
in Coding Theory)
4.1 Equivalence with McEliece PKC
As mentioned earlier in the text that original Niederreiter scheme worked for Generalized Reed Solomon codes.
This lead to a major security threat as mentioned by Sidelnikov and Shestakov [26]. Though it was earlier stated
that the scheme of Niederreiter and McEliece worked alike provided they use same underlying code i.e., binary
Goppa code. The benefit of using Niederreiter scheme was that the size of key needed was much reduced.
The question of showing both these schemes can be converted into each other, or their equivalence relation is
described as below.
4.2 McEliece to Niederreiter
In the McEliece PKC, we have a message m of length k and a public key matrix G′ of size k × n. We also have
an error vector e of length n and weight t which depends on code used. The ciphertext c is obtained as
c = mG′ + e.
From our context of coding theory, the parity check matrix can be obtained from generator matrix. Assuming
that G′ is generator matrix of some code, we obtain H′ the parity check matrix for that code. Now post
multiplying (H′)T to above relation, we have
c(H′)T = mG′(H′)T + e(H′)T .
Since we have G′(H′)T = 0, we arrive at the following equation
c(H′)T = e(H′)T .
Now the left side of the equation is known as c and (H′)T are publicly available. It is also known that weight of
e is t. Therefore from Niederreiter scheme, we can find the vector e. Once the error vector e is known, going
back to original system we have
c − e = mG′.
On expanding the definition of G′ we make use of private keys and decoding of Goppa code to get the message
m. This shows that if Niederreiter scheme is vulnerable/broken then McEliece scheme also suffers.
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4.3 Niederreiter to McEliece
As per description of Niederreiter scheme, we have message y of length n and weight t. The ciphertext z is
obtained by multiplication of transpose of an (n − k) × n sized matrix H′ with message, as described
z = y(H′)T .
Using augmented matrix and some facts from linear algebra, one can easily find a vector c of length n having
weight at least t such that
z = c(H′)T and (3)
c = mG′ + y. (4)
Hence, Niederreiter scheme can be easily converted to McEliece scheme. Thereafter both these schemes hold
equivalence in terms of security provided they use same Goppa code.
4.4 Information-Set Decoding Attack
Implementation of Information set decoding attack on Niederreiter’s scheme can be done in different ways.
Like first convert into McEliece’s problem and apply same information set decoding algorithm as described in
McEliece’s scheme. Another method, which is a direct algorithm is described below.
(i) Guess an ‘n − k’ sized set which contains all non-zero coordinates of message m. The probability of
success comes out to be (
t
t
)(
n−t
n−k−t
)(
n
n−k
) .
(ii) Check if the submatrix obtained by the corresponding columns in S · H · P is invertible. The work factor
for checking this comes out to be (n − k)3;
(iii) Pre-multiplying the inverse of this submatrix describes the message vector completely.
In order to execute the attack on this scheme, the work factor comes out to be(
n
n−k
)(
t
t
)(
n−t
n−k−t
) · (n − k)3 (5)
which is the similar as described in McEliece cryptosystem. Hence the corresponding difficulty in applying
information-set decoding attack on Niederreiter is same as for McEliece cryptosystem.
Niederreiters inversion problem is equivalent to McElieces inversion problem for the same code. In par-
ticular, any attack recovering a random e from Niederreiter’s He and H can be used with negligible overhead
to recover a random (m, e) from McEliece’s Gm + e and G. Specifically, compute H from G, multiply H by
Gm + e to obtain HGm + He = He, apply the attack to recover e from He, subtract e from Gm + e to obtain
Gm, and recover m by linear algebra.
4.5 Keys Allocation
Public Key : • The (n − k) × n sized matrix S · H · P.
Private Keys : • Matrices S and P of sizes (n − k) × (n − k) and n × n resp.;
• the t−degree Goppa polynomial g(z) over F2m , and
• the set L = {α1, α2, . . . , αn} ⊆ F2m .
As per the parameters of Goppa codes provided in original construction of McEliece cryptosystem,
n : 1024 = 210
t : 50
m : 10
k : n − mt = 524,
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the size of public key is:
(n − k)n = 500 × 1024 = 512000 bits
≈ 62 KB; and
The size of private key is:
((n − k)2 + n2) + (t × m) + (n × m) = (250000 + 1048576) + 500 + 10240 = 1309316 bits
≈ 159.8 KB. This shows that the Niederreiter’s scheme using dual of Goppa codes can actually decrease the
problem of large key size to some extent.
5 Classic McEliece: conservative code based cryptography
A Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) is basically a Public-Key Encryption (PKE) scheme. It consists of
three algorithms: Key generation, Encapsulation and Decapsulation. The key generation part is a probabilistic
algorithm that takes input a security parameter (like security required in bits) and outputs a public key pk and
a private key sk. Secondly, the encapsulation algorithm receives a public key pk and returns a symmetric key
(session key) and ciphertext pair (K, ψ0). Notation wise, Encpk() = (K, ψ0) and Decsk(ψ0) = K. Finally, the
decapsulation algorithm that receives a private ket sk and a ciphertext ψ0 and outputs either the symmetric key
K or failure.
Classic McEliece is a Key Encapsulation Mechanism, which establishes a symmetric key for two end users.
This KEM is also a candidate in second round 1 for NIST’s competition of global standardization of Post
Quantum Cryptosystem by Daniel J. Bernstein et al., submitted in 2017 [3]. It is designed to provide IND-
CCA2 security at a very high security level, even against quantum computers. The definition for a KEM to be
IND-CCA2 secure follows afterwards. The KEM is built conservatively from a PKE designed for OW-CPA
one way security, namely Niederreiter’s dual version of McEliece’s public key encryption PKE using binary
Goppa codes. The steps describing KEM are as follows:
Step 1: Suppose Alice asks Bob to establish a session key using Classic McEliece key encapsulation mecha-
nism where the extension field F2m is publicly known.
Step 2: Bob generates his Classic McEliece key pair as:
(i) Firstly, he generates a random monic irreducible polynomial g(z) ∈ F2m[z] of degree ‘t’;
(ii) Selects uniformly random set {α1, α2, . . . , αn} ⊆ F2m with all distinct elements;
(iii) Computes a ‘t × n’ sized matrix H˜ =
{
hi, j
}
over F2m , where hi, j = αi−1j g(αi)
−1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , t
and j = 1, 2, . . . , n;
(iv) Replaces each entry of the matrix H˜ (elements of F2m) with vectors of Fm2 (arranged in columns)
using vector space isomorphism between F2m and Fm2 to get ‘mt × n’ sized matrix Hˆ;
(v) Apply Gaussian elimination on Hˆ to get a systematic matrix H =
(
Imt | Tmt×(n−mt)) if possible,
else go back to step (i);
(vi) Generates a uniform random n-bit string s;
(vii) Public key: T ; and
(viii) Private key: {s, g(z), α1, α2, . . . , αn}.
Step 3: Using the Public key T of Bob, Alice starts the Key Encapsulation Process. She generates a session
key K and ciphertext C as follows:
(i) Generates a uniform random vector e ∈ Fn2 with Hamming weight ‘t’;
1as on June 2019
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(ii) Niederreiter Encoding: Using public key ‘T ’ of Bob, first she computes matrix H, secondly a
vector C0 = He = (I | T )e of length mt in Fmt2 ;
(iii) Computes C1 = H(2, e) and generate ciphertext C = (C0,C1) of length mt + 256 bits;
(iv) Computes a 256-bit session key K = H(1, e,C).
Here H is SHAKE256, and the initials 0, 1 and 2 in above hash inputs are represented as a byte.
Step 4: Bob receives the ciphertext C from Alice, and starts decrypting it using Decapsulation Process to
generate the some session key K′ as:
(i) Firstly, he splits C as (C0,C1), with C0 ∈ Fmt2 and C1 ∈ F2562 ;
(ii) Sets b← 1.
(iii) Decoding step:
(a) Input: C0 and the private key {s, g(z), α1, α2, . . . , αn}.
(b) Extend C0 to v = (C0, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Fn2 by appending n − mt zeros.
(c) Using Niederreiter decoding, find the unique codeword c in Goppa code defined by
Γ = { g(z), α1, α2, . . . , αn }
s.t., d(c, v) ≤ t, if possible. If no such codeword exist, return ⊥ and move to step (iii).
(d) In case when codeword c exists, set the vector e = v + c. If wt(e) = t and C0 = He, return e.
Otherwise return ⊥ .
(iv) If decoding returns ⊥, set e← s and b← 0.
(v) Computes C′1 = H(2, e), and checks if C
′
1 = C1. If it doesn’t match, set e← s and b← 0.
(vi) Computes the session key K′ = H(b, e,C).
Note: If there is no failure at any stage during the decapsulation process and C′1 = C1, then surely
the session key K′ will be identical to K. Equivalently, if Bob receives a valid (legitimate) ciphertext C i.e.,
C = (C0,C1) with C0 = He for some e ∈ Fn2 of weight t and C1 = H(2, e), the decoding always result in finding
the vector e. In this scenario the same session key is established.
The generic model of Classic McEliece Key Encapsulation Mechanism is described below:
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This representation is the ideal case when Bob has received the ciphertext without any noise and he was
able to decrypt that without failure. Otherwise, the same session key is not established.
• There is a possibility that Bob computes wrong session key for him. This is possible only if he receives
noise in ciphertext received. Further, this can be ensured by both Alice and Bob if
– they communicate and compare hash values of their computed session keys, or
– Alice transmits AES K (H (T )) to Bob so that he can verify if he has got correct session by decrypting
the received ciphertext using his session key and matching the result with hash of his public key.
If same key is not established, the process re-initiates.
• It is to be noted that the field F2m described in the KEM is defined by a 13-degree primitive polynomial
f (z) = z13 + z4 + z3 + z + 1
over F2 and the Hash function used is SHAKE256 with 32-byte output.
• The values of n and t varies as per different variants.
From this algorithm, Alice and Bob establish a session key K which can then be used to implement sym-
metric key cryptography. Viewing Classic McEliece KEM from coding theory point, we have basically two
types of attacks: Decoding attack and Structural attack. The information-set decoding is the most effective
attack strategy known. It does not exploit the structure of generator matrix; it recovers the error vector e from
publicly available matrix and the ciphertext. There are many papers which states algorithms to recover private
key from the public key like Sendrier’s support splitting algorithm. However, despite this and other concerned
algorithms, key recovery attacks are vastly slower than information-set decoding.
Example 5.1 (Classic McEliece with Small Parameters) Suppose Alice asks Bob to establish a Classic
McEliece based session key. The publicly known extension field
F24 =
F2[x]〈
x4 + x3 + 1
〉 = F2(β),
where β, being a primitive element of the field F24 , is a root of the irreducible polynomial x4 + x3 + 1. Then the
field F24 = F2(β) consists of {0, 1, β, β2, . . . , β14}. Here β15 = 1. The error correcting capacity i.e., the parameter
t = 2 is also publicly known.
Key Generation
(i) Bob generates g(z) = z2 + z + β an irreducible polynomial over F2(β) of degree t = 2.
(ii) Let L = F2(β) = {0, 1, β, β2, . . . , β14} be set of n = 16 elements of F2(β).
We make use of the following table to describe elements of the field F2(β):
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0 = = (0, 0, 0, 0)T ;
1 = 1 = (1, 0, 0, 0)T ;
β = β = (0, 1, 0, 0)T ;
β2 = β2 = (0, 0, 1, 0)T ;
β3 = β3 = (0, 0, 0, 1)T ;
β4 = 1+ β3 = (1, 0, 0, 1)T ;
β5 = 1+ β+ β3 = (1, 1, 0, 1)T ;
β6 = 1+ β+ β2+ β3 = (1, 1, 1, 1)T ;
β7 = 1+ β+ β2 = (1, 1, 1, 0)T ;
β8 = β+ β2+ β3 = (0, 1, 1, 1)T ;
β9 = 1+ β2 = (1, 0, 1, 0)T ;
β10 = β+ β3 = (0, 1, 0, 1)T ;
β11 = 1+ β2+ β3 = (1, 0, 1, 1)T ;
β12 = 1+ β = (1, 1, 0, 0)T ;
β13 = β+ β2 = (0, 1, 1, 0)T ;
β14 = β2+ β3 = (0, 0, 1, 1)T ;
(iii) As described in the algorithm,
• h1,1 = (1 + 1 + β)−1 = β−1 = β14;
• h1,2 = (0 + 0 + β)−1 = β−1 = β14;
• h1,3 = (β2 + β + β)−1 = β−2 = β13;
• h1,4 = (β4 + β2 + β)−1 = (β3 + β2 + β + 1)−1 = (β6)−1 = β9;
• h1,5 = (β6 + β3 + β)−1 = β6, etc.
• h2,1 = 0 · (1 + 1 + β)−1 = 0;
• h2,2 = 1 · (0 + 0 + β)−1 = β−1 = β14;
• h2,3 = β · (β2 + β + β)−1 = β · β−2 = β−1 = β14;
• h2,4 = β2 · (β4 + β2 + β)−1 = β2 · β9 = β11;
• h2,5 = β3 · β6 = β9, etc.
The 2 × 16 sized matrix H˜ is given by(
β14 β14 β13 β9 β6 β6 β3 β7 β11 β7 β9 β3 β12 β13 β11 β12
0 β14 β14 β11 β9 β10 β8 β13 β3 1 β3 β13 β8 β10 β9 β11
)
(iv) The matrix Hˆ becomes
Hˆ =

0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1

.
(v) On applying Gaussian elimination, the matrix H becomes
H =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0

.
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(vi) Let the random 16-bit string s = (0000000000000000).
(vii) The Public key is given by
T =

1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0

.
The private key is (s, g(z),F2(β)).
Now, Bob shares his public key T with Alice. On receiving this matrix Alice does
Key Encapsulation process as described Key Encapsulation
(i) Generate random plaintext e = (1100000000000000) of length n = 16 and weight t = 2.
(ii) C0 = He = (11000000).
(iii) C1 = H(2, e) = 26 f e36 f 811ac8 f e9 f 19ba997a39d3682e f 06b29509cca1903 f f e4a0b247c833 f =
00100110111111100011011011111000000100011010110010001111111010011111000110011011101
01001101011110100011100111010011011010000010111011110011010110010100101010100111001
10010100001100100011111111111110010010100101100100100011111001000001100111111.
Assuming hash to be SHA256.
(iv) Session key K = H(1, e,C) =
90d7c9dccc4689f6894b1b6e58ee9b3832 8e4df9937536eb9b5715a38ee4e1be. The output ciphertext
C = (C0,C1) =
11000000001001101111111000110110111110000001000110101100100011111110100111110001100
11011101010011001011110100011100111010011011010000010111011110011010110010100101010
10011100110010100001100100011111111111110010010100101100100100011111001000001100111
111.
On receiving this ciphertext, Bob performs decapsulation process. During this, he splits the first 8 bits as
C0, executes decoding on it to find e. This process is explained below with reference to Proposition 1.6.1.:
Decapsulation
(i) The vector v = (C0, 00000000) = (1100000000000000).
(ii) Finding nearest codeword in Goppa code Γ:
• Syndrome of the received vector v is calculated as
S (v) =
1
z
+
1
z + 1
mod g(z).
Hence S (v) = β13.
• The key equation S (z)σ(z) ≡ w(z) mod g(z) implies
(z2 + (α1 + α2)z + α1α2)β13 = α1 + α2 mod g(z).
• Thus, on comparing the coefficients both sides, we get
α1 + α2 = 0 and α1α2 = 0.
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• Hence α1 = 0 and α2 = 1.
• Thus the error in received vector becomes (1100000000000000). This means the closest codeword
c = (0000000000000000).
• The vector e = v + c = (1100000000000000).
(iii) As the Hamming weight of vector e is equal to t = 2, and C′1 = H(2, e) = C1, Bob computes the session
key K = H(1, e,C).

5.1 Information-Set Decoding Attack
The Classic McEliece key encapsulation mechanism submitted in NIST contains two variants depending upon
parameter sets which provides different security levels.
Variant n m t k = n − mt Security
mceliece6960119 6960 13 119 5413 128
mceliece8192128 8192 13 128 6528 256
Classic McEliece works by operating dual of the McEliece cryptosystem (Niederreiter cryptosystem). Both
the systems provide same security, and the information-set decoding also works in same fashion. Suppose the
attacker has received the ciphertext (C0,C1), then he applies information set-decoding on C0 as he knows the
length of C0 and since C0 = He.
As per the work factor described in Niederreiter’s information-set decoding attack,
(n − k)3 ·
(
n
n−k
)(
n−t
n−k−t
) . (6)
For the first variant mceliece6960119 parameters used are n = 6960, m = 13, t = 119 and k = n − mt = 5413.
The work factor comes out to be
7.5 × 1088 ≈ 2295.
For the second parameters set viz. mceliece8192128, the work factor for implementation of information-set
decoding attack comes out to be
1.03 × 10100 ≈ 2332.
Using McEliece conversion:
After converting Niederreiter scheme into McEliece scheme, the information set decoding parameters are
changed as the work factor becomes
k3 ·
(
n
k
)(
n−t
k
) . (7)
Now plugging-in, the parameters set n = 6960, m = 13, t = 119 and k = n − mt = 5413, the work factor comes
out to be
≈ 3.2 × 1090 ≈ 2301.
Further, for the parameters set n = 8192, m = 13, t = 128, the work factor becomes
≈ 6 × 10101 ≈ 2338.
In the paper of Daniel J. Bernstein et al. [5] in 2008, it is proved that the number of bit operations to break
the (6960, 13, 119) variant is 2266.94.
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5.2 Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks
For this Key Encapsulation Mechanism, chosen ciphertext attacks do not work as per following reasons.
? Ciphertext includes hash of the message as a confirmation, and the attacker can never compute the hash of a
modified version of message without knowing message in the first place.
? There are no decryption failures, i.e., the modified ciphertext will produce an unpredictable session key,
whether or not the modified message vector has weight t.
5.3 Keys Allocation
Public Key : • The mt × (n − mt) sized matrix T .
Private Keys : • s ∈ Fn2;• the t-degree Goppa polynomial g(z) over F2m , and
• the set L = {α1, α2, . . . , αn} ⊆ F2m .
Here we examine the key sizes as per the different variants proposed. These are expressed as:
5.4 mceliece6960119
Each row of T is represented as d(n − mt)/8e-byte string, and there are total mt rows in T . As per given
parameters, the size of public key is:
mtd(n − mt)/8e = 13 · 119 · d(6960 − 13 · 119)/8e = 1047319 bytes
≈ 1 MB.
Private key consist of (s, g(z), α1, . . . , αn). For representation of string s ∈ Fn2, dn/8e-bytes are stored. The
polynomial g(z) is a monic polynomial of degree t over F2m . Hence it saves t coefficients where each coefficient
is dm/8e-byte string. So total there are tdm/8e-bytes for saving this. The sequence of elements (α1, α2, . . . , αn)
are stored as n field elements using Benesˆ network. The size of private keys is:
dn/8e + tdm/8e + d(2m − 1)2m−4e = 870 + 238 + 12800 = 13908 bytes ≈ 13.6 KB.
5.5 mceliece8192128
Similarly, for this set of parameters, the size of public key is:
mtd(n − mt)/8emt = d(8192 − 13 · 128)/8e · 13 · 128 = 1357824 bytes ≈ 1.3MB.
The size of private keys: dn/8e + tdm/8e + d(2m − 1)2m−4e (using Benesˆ network) = 1024 + 256 + 12800 =
14080 bytes ≈ 13.75 KB.
6 Strength of the Cryptosystem
Clearly brute force is not feasible to all the discussed cryptosystems. However, original McEliece cryptosystem
is vulnerable to chosen-plaintext attacks. The encoding matrix is the public key, usually publicly available,
and the attacker can simply guess some plaintext, construct the corresponding ciphertext and compare this
to the target ciphertext. This system, based up on original parameters, is now completely broken. However,
on suitably increasing the size of parameters, the scheme is proved to resist all kind of attacks. The standard
classification of cryptographic attacks to block ciphers concording the amount and quality of secret information
they are able to discover are listed as:
• Total break - the attacker deduces the secret key.
• Global deduction - the attacker discovers an equivalent algorithm for encryption and decryption without
learning the secret key.
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• Local deduction - the attacker discovers additional plaintext-ciphertext which were not earlier known.
• Information deduction - the attacker gains some Shannon information about plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
• Distinguishing algorithm - the attacker can distinguish the cipher from a random string.
The McEliece PKC is immune to total break in polynomial time. However, the original system is vulnerable to
chosen-ciphertext attack. Suppose message m is encrypted as c = mG + e. If we select one bit at random from
the set of bits which corresponds to 1, and one bit from the set of bits which correspond to 0 in the error vector
e, then upon inverting these bits, we get a different ciphertext having t errors. With probability t(n − t)/n(n − 1),
a new different ciphertext will be produced containing exactly t errors. Thus assuming a decryption oracle is
available, the attacker sends this new ciphertext to the decryption oracle that will output the plaintext, breaking
the system.
As per the original parameters of McEliece PKC i.e., for n = 1024, and t = 50 the probability for choosing
different ciphertext with corresponding to same message as described above becomes
t(n − t)
n(n − 1) =
50 · 974
1024 · 1023 = 0.046489. (8)
Hence the work factor becomes 21.5. So out of 22 calls to decryption oracle, the attacker can implement
adaptive CCA attack on this PKC.
Definition 6.1 [23] The adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attack game for a KEM proceeds as follows:
(i) Query a key generation oracle to obtain a public key pk.
(ii) Make a sequence of calls to a decapsulation oracle, submitting any string of the proper length. Oracle
will respond the result after decapsulation of this string.
(iii) Query an encapsulation oracle. The oracle runs the encapsulation algorithm and produces a pair (K¯, φ¯0)
and a random a random string K∗ of same length as of K. Then oracle replies the challenger both pairs
(K¯, φ¯0) say if b = 0 and (K¯∗, φ¯0) if b = 1.
(iv) Challenger then keep performing decapsulation queries for strings other than those challenged above.
(v) Challenger outputs b∗ ∈ {0, 1}.
The adversary succeeds if b∗ = 0 i.e., when it corresponds to correct pair (K¯, φ¯0). More precisely, we define
the advantage A against KEM as
AdvKEM(A , λ) =
∣∣∣∣∣Pr[b∗ = 0] − 12
∣∣∣∣∣ .
We say that a KEM is secure under adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks if the advantage AdvKEM of any polyno-
mial time adversary A in the above CCA model is negligible.
McEliece’s original PKE was not designed to resist chosen-ciphertext attacks, but the KEM Classic McEliece
possesses IND-CCA2 security. It employs the best practices manifested like:
• The session key comes from hash of uniform random input vector e.
• Ciphertext consists of confirmation also, ie., another hash of vector e.
• After computation of e, using private key, from ciphertext, ciphertext is recomputed for confirmation that
it matches.
• If decryption fails for reverse computation, KEM do not return failure; instead it return a pseudo-random
function of the ciphertext, specifically a cryptographic hash of a separate private key and the ciphertext.
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Subsequently there have been a lot of publications studying the one-wayness of the system and introducing
sophisticated non-quantum attack algorithms: Clark-Cain [11], crediting Omura; Lee-Brickell [16]; Leon [17];
Krouk [15]; Stern [27]; van Tilburg [28]; Chabaud [10]; Bernstein-Lange-Peters [6]; Finiasz-Sendrier [13];
May-Meurer-Thomae [18].
This led to transformation of McEliece cryptosystem to public key cryptosystem, namely Classic McEliece.
It is structured in the Niederreiter’s dual version of the McEliece scheme. It is a key encapsulation mechanism
designed to exchange the symmetric key using public key cryptosystem. Ciphertext includes hash function
values to provide integrity check. The indistinguishability criteria against chosen ciphertext attacks for a KEM
is elaborated as follows.
In order to be secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks, for a query of getting plaintext from random
ciphertext, there are no decryption failures. For a non legitimate (invalid) ciphertext, the decapsulation process
work and outputs some session key. The KEM is structured in such a way that it do not leak side channel errors
in case of decryption failures.
With the same key-size optimizations, the Classic McEliece system uses a key size of (c0 + o(1))b2(log b)2
bits to achieve 2b security against all non-quantum attacks known today, where c0 is exactly the same constant.
All of the improvements have disappeared into the o(1). The decapsulation process does not reveal any addi-
tional information: i.e., all attacks are as difficult as passive attacks. It outputs a session key for all ciphertexts
whether they are valid or not. To be precise in applying information set decoding, a random set of k positions
to be an information set with reasonable probability is 29%. However, the chance of this set being error free
drops rapidly as the number of errors increase.
Some applications for iPhone and iPad use McEliece public key encryption scheme are the S2S application
and PQChat.
• In S2S app, files are encrypted with users’ public keys and stored in the cloud so that they may be shared.
Sharing is by means of links that index the encrypted files on the cloud and each user uses their private
key to decrypt the shared files.
• The PQChat is a secure instant messaging system application which uses McEliece cryptosystem to
provide security.
The first parameters set for Classic McEliece “mceliece6960119” takes m = 13, n = 6960 and t = 119.
This parameters set came when the original McEliece parameters (10, 1024, 50) were proved to be attacked.
The subsequent information set decoding have marginally reduced the number of bit operations considerably
below 2256.
Concerning efficiency, the use of random-looking linear codes with no visible structure draws public-key
sizes to be on the scale of a MB for quantitatively high security: the public key is a full (generator/parity-check)
matrix. Applications must extend using each public key for long enough to handle the costs of generating and
distributing the key.
7 Conclusion & Future Work
Based on hard problems which do not seem to be affected by presently available quantum algorithms, there
is a scope for McEliece cryptosystem based scheme to be used as post-quantum cryptosystem candidate. The
duration of its analysis also contribute to the security of McEliece PKC since it is as former as RSA. The
problem of handling and operating with large keys is the only concern with this cryptosystem. Although, there
is always a scope of reducing the key size further without giving a loss to its security.
In this report, we focused on a public key cryptosystem, which is designed long back based on coding
theory which can be used in practice once large scale quantum computers are built. It is expected that breaking
Classic McEliece with parameters (6960, 119) is more expensive than to break AES−256 in both pre-quantum
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and much more in post-quantum scenario. The future work for this cryptosystem would be to implement the
attacks on it and to compare this system with other post-quantum cryptosystems.
We have compiled MATLAB code to execute the implementation of information set decoding attack for
a given generator matrix for a linear code over binary field. Accompanying that, we have added a method to
find generalized inverse of any matrix over binary field, which is somehow useful in context as described in
following Appendix.
In future, we will try formulating algorithms based on quantum computing for information set decoding or
any attack which can be implemented on this system. Moreover, when analyzing other code based post quantum
cryptosystems we can compare their structure with this system and find possibilities of further improvements
or attacks.
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Appendix
A Generalized Inverses
The world of mathematics revolve about a few key equations. One of the famous problems of mathematics are
solving the following
Ax = b, where A ∈ Cm×n, x ∈ Cn and b ∈ Cm. (9)
This type of problems appear in many abstract or arithmetic cases. We have a well known result that
• if rank[A : b] = rank(A), then
– there is a unique solution if rank(A) = n;
– there are infinitely many solutions if rank(A) < n;
• there is no solution if rank[A : b] , rank(A).
An obvious case if the matrix A is square and its determinant is non-zero, the solution to above system
would be x = A−1b. Here we talk about inverse of a matrix. The inverse exists only when matrix is invertible
i.e., non-singular. Now we move towards generalized inverses or Moore-Penrose inverse of any matrix.
Definition A.1 (Generalized inverse) For any matrix A ∈ Cm×n, the generalized inverse of A, denoted by A†
is a unique matrix in Cn×m such that
(i) AA†A = A,
(ii) A†AA† = A†,
(iii)
(
AA†
)∗
= AA†,
(iv)
(
A†A
)∗
= A†A.
We will see a few interesting properties of generalized inverse once we compute it. We make use of
following proposition for achieving that aim.
Proposition A.1 If A ∈ Cm×n, then there exists B ∈ Cm×r and C ∈ Cr×n such that
A = BC and (10)
rank(A) = rank(B) = rank(C) = r. (11)
The proof of this result follows by taking into account the Echelon form of A. The echelon form of matrix A if
of the form
EA =
[
Cr×n
0(m−r)×n
]
This shows how the matrix C is generated. The echelon form of A is obtained by applying permutations to
rows of A, this means EA = P A. So the matrix B is inverse of the permutation matrix P. For further proof
and readings, one may refer [8]. Using this method one may compute the decomposition matrices having
aforementioned properties. These contribute to computing the generalized inverse as following result.
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Theorem A.1 [8] If A = BC where A ∈ Cm×n,B ∈ Cm×r,C ∈ Cr×n and r = rank(A) = rank(B) = rank(C),
then
A† = C∗(CC∗)−1(B∗B)−1B∗. (12)

This matrix have certain useful properties. Firstly, it may be noted that matrices B∗B and CC∗ are of
rank r in Cr×r. Hence these are invertible matrices. If the given matrix A is already an invertible matrix, the
generalized inverse A† is identical to inverse of A i.e., A−1.
Corollary A.1.1 As a consequence to this, we have
AA† = BCC∗(CC∗)−1(B∗B)−1B∗ = (B∗B)−1B∗ (13)
A†A = C∗(CC∗)−1(B∗B)−1B∗BC = C∗(CC∗)−1. (14)
Now, anyhow on computing matrices B and C, if it comes out that either of them is an identity matrix, we
have a crucial result.
If the matrix B is identity, then in (13), AA† = I. Similar result holds for other case.
A.1 Code-based Cryptography
The generator matrices of codes are prone to generalized inverses since for an (n, k)−code, the generator matrix
is a k × n matrix of rank k over finite field. For such matrices, if Proposition A.0.1 holds true and the matrices
(CC∗) and (B∗B) are invertible in the underlying field, the generalized inverse exists. Wu C.K. et al. in 1998
[30] showed that for any matrix over finite field, its {1, 2}−inverse always exist. For {1, 2}−inverse, it means
that the points (i) and (ii) of Definition A.0.2 are only satisfied by the “pseudo-generalized inverse”.
Similarly for parity check matrices, generalized inverse exist. In case of Classic McEliece KEM, the public
key is indeed the parity check matrix for the Goppa code and is of special kind
H =
(
Imt | Tmt×(n−mt)) .
In this scenario, the decomposition matrices from Proposition A.0.1 comes out to be B = Imt and C = H. Hence
as per Corollary A.0.1.1, HH† = I if the matrix HHT is invertible in F2. On making use of this notion, if we
had a message m, which was to be encrypted as mH, where H is the publicly known matrix of above mentioned
type, the decryption would be simply multiplying by generalized inverse of H i.e., mHH†. Since the message
is encrypted by post multiplication with transpose of H, it is prone towards this attack. The amount of work
needed to be done in order to find H† will be same as finding information set for the same matrix.
A.2 MATLAB code for Generalized Inverses of Generator Matrix
Reading Generator Matrix B from file ‘Bmatrix.txt’ over binary field
fid = fopen(‘Bmatrix.txt’);
Bdim = fscanf(fid,‘%d’,[1 2]);
B = fscanf(fid,‘%d’,[Bdim(1,1),Bdim(1,2)]);
fclose(fid);
m = Bdim(1,1); % Num. of rows of B
n = Bdim(1,2); % Num. of columns of B
A = B;
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Echelon Matrix Preparation
if m<n
mindim = m;
maxdim = n;
else
mindim = n;
maxdim = m;
end
counter = maxdim;
flag = 0;
j = 1;
I = eye(m);
for i= 1:counter
if A(j,i) ˜= 1
for k = (j+1):m
if A(k,i) == 1
A(j,:) = mod((A(j,:) - A(k,:)),2);
I(j,:) = mod((I(j,:) - I(k,:)),2);
flag = 1;
break;
end
end
else
flag = 1;
end
if flag == 0
if(j >=m || i>=n)
break;
end
continue;
else
for k = (j+1):m
if A(k,i) ˜= 0
A(k,:) = mod((A(k,:) - A(j,:)),2);
I(k,:) = mod((I(k,:) - I(j,:)),2);
end
end
j = j +1;
if j>m
break;
end
end
flag = 0;
end
C = mod(inv(I),2); % Inverse of permutation Matrix
Calculation of B†:
BDagg = A’ * inv(A*A’) * inv(C’*C) * C’
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if (mod(det(A*A.’),2) ˜= 0 && mod(det(C.’*C),2) ˜=0)
BDagg = (A.’)*det(A*A.’)*(inv(A*A.’))*det(C.’*C)*(inv(C.’*C))*C.’;
BDagg = mod(int32(BDagg),2);
BDagg = double(BDagg);
fprintf(1,‘\nOriginal Matrix :’);
B
fprintf(1,‘\nGeneralized Inverse Matrix :’);
BDagg
%Relations Check
% Relation 1. B*BDagg*B = B
if mod(B*BDagg*B,2) == mod(B,2)
fprintf(1,‘\nRelation B*BDagg*B = B satisfied\n’);
% Relation 2. BDagg*B*BDagg = BDagg
if mod(BDagg*B*BDagg,2) == mod(BDagg,2)
fprintf(1,‘\nRelation BDagg*B*BDagg = BDagg satisfied\n’);
% Relation 3. (B*BDagg)’ = B*BDagg
if mod((B*BDagg)’,2) == mod(B*BDagg,2)
fprintf(1,‘\nRelation (B*BDagg)’’ = B*BDagg satisfied\n’);
end
% Relation 4. (BDagg*B)’ = BDagg*B
if mod((BDagg*B)’,2) == mod(BDagg*B,2)
isInvFound = 1;
fprintf(1,‘\nRelation (BDagg*B)’’ = BDagg*B satisfied\n’);
end
end
end
else
fprintf(1,‘\nError in Inverse calculation of matrix\n’);
end
Original Matrix :
B =
00010
10000
01010
00110
Generalized Inverse Matrix :
BDagg =
0100
1010
1001
1000
0000
Relation B*BDagg*B = B satisfied
Relation BDagg*B*BDagg = BDagg satisfied
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Relation (B*BDagg)’ = B*BDagg satisfied
Relation (BDagg*B)’ = BDagg*B satisfied
A.3 MATLAB code for execution of ISD attack on small parameters of McEliece PKC
tstart = cputime;
fid = fopen(‘Example1.txt’);
code = fscanf(fid,‘%d’,[1,2]);
G = fscanf(fid,‘%d’,[code(1,1),code(1,2)]);
e = fscanf(fid,‘%d’,[1,code(1,2)]);
fclose(fid);
k = code(1,1);
n = code(1,2);
fprintf(1,‘Information set decoding attack for McEliece PKC.\n’);
fprintf(1,‘k = %d\n’,k);
fprintf(1,‘n = %d\n’,n);
m = randi([0,1],[1,k]);
m
G
e
c = mod(mod(m*G,2) + e,2);
c
fid = fopen(‘ans1.txt’,‘w’);
fprintf(fid,‘Information set decoding started:\n’);
nck = nchoosek(n,k);
nckMatrix = nchoosek((1:n),k);
for i=1:nck
fprintf(fid,‘---------------------------------------’);
fprintf(fid,‘\nIteration: %d \n’,i);
fprintf(fid,‘I%d = {’,i);
fprintf(fid,‘%d, ’,nckMatrix(i,:));
fprintf(fid,‘}\n’);
Gdelta = zeros(k,k);
for j = 1:k
Gdelta(:,j) = G(:,nckMatrix(i,j));
cdelta(:,j) = c(:,nckMatrix(i,j));
end
[GdeltaDiag,isInvFound] = genInverse(k,k,Gdelta);
if isInvFound == 1
mVerify = mod(cdelta*GdeltaDiag,2);
if all(m == mVerify) == 1
fprintf(fid,‘\nInformation set decoding attack successful.\n’);
%mVerify
%GdeltaDiag
%break;
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else
fprintf(fid,‘\nInformation set decoding attack unsuccessful.\n’);
end
else
fprintf(fid,‘\nWrong Information set selected.\n’);
end
end
fprintf(fid,‘---------------------------------------\n’);
tend = cputime - tstart;
fprintf(fid,‘Time taken in complete execution: %g\n’,tend);
fclose(fid);
Information set decoding attack for McEliece PKC.
k = 8
n = 16
m =
00000100
G =
1010011010000000
0111010101000000
1111000000000001
0111101000010000
1011110000001000
1010110100000010
1001111000000100
0110001100100000
e =
1010000000000000
c =
0000110100000010
Output of ‘ans.txt’:
Information set decoding started:
---------------------------------------------
Iteration: 1
I1 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, }
Information set decoding attack unsuccessful.
---------------------------------------------
...
Iteration: 4
I4 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, }
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Wrong Information set selected.
---------------------------------------------
...
Iteration: 8159
I8159 = {2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, }
Information set decoding attack successful.
---------------------------------------------
...
---------------------------------------------
Time taken in complete execution: 2.10938
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